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ORGANIZED ILLUSIONS: A BEHAVIORAL THEORY OF WHY
CORPORATIONS MISLEAD STOCK MARKET INVESTORS
(AND CAUSE OTHER SOCIAL HARMS)
DONALD C. LANGEVOORTt
Rationality is a strong assumption in the legal literature about
how corporations and other organizations behave in market settings.
The modem transaction-cost economics on which most contemporary
corporate scholarship is based' concedes that the rationality of offi-
cers, directors, and other managers is "bounded" (that is, that they do
not have perfect information or unlimited time, skill, and attention)
and acknowledges that these agents have self-interests that differ from
those of their firms' owners. Because of these limits and the imper-
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' This literature is sufficiently pervasive that it hardly needs extensive citation; key
legal texts in corporate law include FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE
ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW (1991); PRINCIPALS AND AGENTS (John W.
Pratt & Richard J. Zeckhauser eds., 1985); ROBERTA ROMANO, THE GENIUS OF
AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW (1993); and Symposium, Contractual Freedom in Corporate
Law, 89 COLuM. L. REV. 1395 (1989). This is not to say that it is uncontroversial; legal
critics have questioned its power and accuracy from any number of perspectives. See,
e.g., Douglas M. Branson, The Death of Contractualism and the Vindication of Structure and
Authority in Corporate Law Governance and Corporate Law, in PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE
LAW 93, 93, 105 (Lawrence Mitchell ed., 1995) (arguing that law-and-economics theo-
ries do not adequately justify a hands-off approach to corporate law, so that "it]here
must be structure and a core of principles and authority in corporate law"). But most
critiques focus primarily on the ineffectiveness of contract as a mechanism for recon-
ciling the competing interests, see, e.g., id. at 94 (arguing that "[u]nder a contractarian
scheme, all but larger minority interests ... would be discouraged"), leading to the
view that absent legally imposed restraints, managers really are entrenched and free to
act selfishly and antisocially, cf. id. at 97 (noting that "there exist some immutable
rules and principles that govern behavior and check unbridled majority power in the
corporate sphere").
2 See, e.g., OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM 43-52
(1985) (discussing bounded rationality and "the behavioral assumptions imputed to
contractual man"); Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm:
Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 309
(1976) (identifying and analyzing agency costs which affect the relationship between
firm owners and management). For a review of the agency-cost branch, see Kathleen
M. Eisenhardt, Agency Theory: An Assessment and Review, 14 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 57
(1989).
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fection of contractual and other mechanisms for resolving them,
firms will not always act in a way that maximizes shareholder wealth.
But within such limitations, the world that is portrayed is still one of
guileful rationality. Firms that depart too far or too often from this
norm will lose access to needed capital and succumb to their more
savvy competitors. Managers are presumed to understand this and act
accordingly.
Borrowing from an explosion of work by social scientists on hu-
man judgment and decisionmaking, legal scholars have been increas-
ingly willing to rethink strong assumptions of rationality in the con-
text of individual behavior, even within markets.3 They have not yet
mined to any depth, however, an equally rich vein of research on or-
ganizational rationality.4 Yet here we find the skeptic's mother lode:
3 In the past decade, there has been a burgeoning literature in both law and eco-
nomics on human decisionmaking and the possibility for heuristics and biases to op-
erate instead of conventional Bayesian rationality. For reviews of some of this research
within the social sciences, see Colin Camerer, Individual Decision Making, in THE
HANDBOOK OF EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS 587 (John H. Kagel & Alvin E. Roth eds.,
1995); Conference, The Behavioral Foundations of Economic Theory, 59 J. Bus. 5181
(1986); John Conlisk, Why Bounded Rationality?, 34J. ECON. LITERATURE 669 (1996);
Lola L. Lopes, Psychology and Economics: Perspectives on Risk, Cooperation, and the Market-
place, 45 ANN. REv. PSYCHOL. 197 (1994). For a small sampling of the contemporary
legal work invoking this material, see Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Limits of Cognition
and the Limits of Contract, 47 STAN. L. REV. 211 (1995); Robert C. Ellickson, Bringing
Culture and Human Frailty to Rational Actors: A Critique of Classical Law and Economics, 65
CHI.-KENT L. REv. 23 (1989); Russell Korobkin & Chris Guthrie, Psychological Barriers to
Litigation Settlement: An Experimental Approach, 93 MICH. L. REv. 107 (1994); Donald C.
Langevoort, Selling Hope, Selling Risk: Some Lessons for Law from Behavioral Economics
About Stockbrokers and Sophisticated Customers, 84 CAL. L. REV. 627 (1996); and Roger G.
Noll & James E. Krier, Some Implications of Cognitive Psychology for Risk Regulation, 19J.
LEGAL STUD. 747 (1990). For a review, see Thomas S. Ulen, Rational Choice and the
Economic Analysis of Law, 19 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 487 (1994). In contrasting these
"biases" with rationality, I do not mean to imply that they may not be adaptive; that is
an intriguing problem that will be explored later in this Article. See also Robert E.
Scott, Error and Rationality in Individual Decisionmaking An Essay on the Relationship Be-
tween Cognitive Illusions and the Management of Choices, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 329, 332 (1986)
("A theory of choice management, which recognizes that individuals deliberately regu-
late their choices and adopt strategies to accomplish their goals, yields richer explana-
tions of the function of many legal rules."). Notwithstanding the problems associated
with its definition, I will use rationality in its standard economic sense.
4 In criminal law, organization theory has had a considerable impact due largely to
the long-standing interest of sociologists in white-collar crime. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER
D. STONE, WHERE THE LAW ENDS 35-36 (1972) (discussing society's inability to monitor
and control illegal corporate behavior);John C. Coffee, Jr., Beyond the Shut-Eyed Sentry:
Toward a Theoretical View of Corporate Misconduct and an Effective Legal Respons4 63 VA. L.
REV. 1099, 1101 (1977) (proposing a shift from "'moralistic' legal responses, which
seek to maximize the public reprobation and symbolic denunciation of the conduct in
question, [to] 'pragmatic' legal responses, which focus instead on prevention and
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empirical accounts-grounded in sociology and social psychology,
but increasingly integrated with economic analysis-for why organiza-
tions so often behave in the myopic, rigid manner that we seem to ob-
serve in the real world. This literature seeks to identify the social
cognitions and norm structures within organizations that can lead to
a "loose coupling" between day-to-day activities and instrumental ra-
tionality for reasons that go well beyond managerial opportunism.6 It
works from the assumption that these social forces are sufficiently
natural and ingrained that they cannot readily be eliminated by struc-
tural or contractual design, and sufficiently contingent on the per-
sonnel in place at any given time and the situation in which the firm
therefore seek to optimize whatever conditions within the system most inhibit the dis-
approved conduct"); Diane Vaughn, Toward Understanding Unlawful Organizational Be-
havior, 80 MICH. L. REV. 1377, 1378 (1982) (examining the impact of American socie-
tal norms and internal corporate structures on unlawful corporate behavior). Even
here, however, there has been more emphasis on the orthodox sociological concep-
tion of the firm as opposed to the new institutionalism's focus on cognitions and belief
structures.
Both individual ("micro") and broad social behaviors ("macro") are the subject
of inquiry within this literature; the micro-macro distinction, though fuzzy, is a com-
mon one. The macro-behavioral accounts (which traditionally have been dominant)
are largely sociological in nature, emphasizing the cultural forces that dominate the
cognitions and behaviors of individual actors. See Alison Davis-Blake & Jeffrey Pfeffer,
just a Mirage: The Search for Dispositional Effects in Organizational Research, 14 ACAD.
MGMT. REV. 385, 397 (1989) (criticizing an organizational-behavior research approach
that "tends to allow organizational participants to escape responsibility for the systems
they design"). The micro-behavioral emphasis, which draws heavily from the social-
cognition branch of psychology that is having such an impact in law and economics,
looks at individual cognitive traits to see how these can affect the behavior of the
larger organization. See supra note 3. For an effort at integration, see Barry M. Staw &
Robert I. Sutton, Macro Organizational Psychology, in SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY IN OR-
GANIZATIONS 350 (J. Keith Murnighan ed., 1993).
6 Good overviews can be found in W. RICHARD ScoTr, ORGANIZATIONS: RATIONAL,
NATURAL, AND OPEN SYSTEMS (3d ed. 1992), and THE NEW INSTITUTIONALISM IN
ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS (Walter W. Powell & Paul J. DiMaggio eds., 1991)
[hereinafter THE NEW INSTITUTIONALUSM]. For efforts to interest legal academics in
these materials, see Walter W. Powell, Fields of Practice: Connections Between Law and Or-
ganizations, 21 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 959 (1996), and Mark C. Suchman & Lauren B.
Edelman, Legal Rational Myths: The New Institutionalism and the Law and Society Tradi-
tion, 21 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 903 (1996) (reviewing THE NEW INSTITUTIONALISM, supra).
For an earlier survey, see Michael B. Metzger, Organizations and the Law, 25 AM. BUS.
L.J. 407 (1987). I have used this research to connect questions of corporate law and
the professional responsibility of corporate lawyers in Donald C. Langevoort, The Epis-
temology of Corporate-Securities Lawyering. Beliefs, Biases and Organizational Behavior, 63
BROOK. L. REV. (forthcoming 1998). Outside of corporate law, a constitutional-law
text that makes considerable use of modem organization theory is MEIR DAN-COHEN,
RIGHTS, PERSONS, AND ORGANIZATIONS (1986); for a critique, with particular reference
to the social-psychological genre, see Richard B. Stewart, OrganizationalJurisprudence
101 HARV. L. REV. 371, 378-80 (1987) (reviewing DAN-COHEN, supra).
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finds itself that they cannot easily be learned away. Competitive
forces are not irrelevant, but are only part of a complex set of institu-
tional influences that operates over the entire marketplace.7
This research affects a good bit of what is taught as organizational
behavior in business schools. There, managerial rationality tends to
be treated more as a holy grail than as an observable reality. Empiri-
cal case studies abound of systemic decisionmaking flaws, with many
of the examples drawn from companies hardly destined for Darwin-
ian extinction. Take, for instance, Robert Burgelman's study of Intel
Corporation's loss of a strong competitive advantage over a twenty-
year period (roughly 1971-1991) in the dynamic random access
memory (DRAM) market-8 Ultimately, Intel recognized the error and
successfully repositioned itself in the microprocessor business.9 In the
end, then, Intel did adapt; no doubt market discipline drove the hard
lesson. But the interesting questions are why it took so long, and
whether it could happen to Intel again in some different context. To
offer answers to these questions here would be to give away too much
of what is to follow in this Article. Suffice it to say that many organiza-
tional theorists suggest that the cognitive and informational difficul-
ties that overcame Intel are pervasive and commonplace. Much of
their theory is social constructionist, going to how organizations per-
ceive themselves, their goals, and their environment, and the poten-
tial for myths in conditions of high ambiguity. 0
7 See Paul J. DiMaggio & Walter W. Powell, Introduction to THE NEW INSTITU-
TIONALISM, supra note 6, at 1, 32 ("Rather than deny the importance of competition,
institutional theorists now emphasize the historical and intersocietal variability of
competitive regimes and the role of institutions in constituting those regimes.").
8 See Robert A. Burgelman, FadingMemories: A Process Theory of Strategic Business Exit
in Dynamic Environments, 39 ADMIN. Sci. Q. 24, 26 (1994) (chronicling and analyzing
the strategic business decision to exit the DRAM market and focus resources on the
microprocessor market). For a critique, see CHRIS ARGYRIS & DONALD SCH6N,
ORGANIZATIONAL LEARNING II, at 211-21 (1996).
" See Burgelman, supra note 8, at 41.
'0 See, e.g., KARL E. WEIcK, SENSEMAKING IN ORGANIZATIONS 63-82 (1995)
(discussing how a corporation shapes organizational structure and behavior via the
sensemaking process); James G. March & Johan P. Olsen, The Uncertainty of the Past:
Organizational Learning Under Ambiguity, in JAMES G. MARCH, DECISIONS AND OR-
GANIZATIONS 350-56 (1988) (discussing how organizational participants learn and in-
terpret events); John W. Meyer & Brian Rowan, Institutionalized Organizations: Formal
Structure as Myth and Ceremony, 83 AM.J. SOC. 340, 341 (1977) (arguing "that the formal
structures of many organizations in postindustrial society dramatically reflect the
myths of their institutional environments instead of the demands of their work activi-
ties"); Suchman & Edelman, supra note 6, at 910-13 (discussing cognitive institutional-
ism and behavioral institutionalism).
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My immediate interest in this scholarship stems from a continu-
ing fascination with a fundamental question in securities regulation
and the primary focus of this Article: Why do companies falsely por-
tray themselves to the capital markets in filings with the Securities and
Exchange Commission (the "SEC") and through other publicity?
The most common sort of large-scale class-action lawsuit alleging se-
curities fraud is one brought against a public corporation and its sen-
ior management for concealing bad news from investors, even though
the company was not in the process of selling its own shares at the
time. This nonprivity "fraud-on-the-market" case typically involves
some form of product or financial degeneration kept from public
view until the last possible moment, leading to a rapid decline in the
market price of the stock once the adverse information is disclosed,
and a set of unhappy investors who bought at a time, they suspect,
when the issuer's managers knew of the problems but nonetheless
kept an optimistic public face. 12 Scores of cases decided by the courts
each year under the principal antifraud provision of the SEC's regula-
tions, Rule 10b-5,13 fall into this category. In 1995, Congress passed
the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act14 largely to deal with per-
ceived abuses associated with this kind of lawsuit.
5
n Under the fraud-on-the-market theory, investors who buy or sell in an efficient
market after some material misrepresentation or omission are presumed to have relied
upon it, a presumption that is all but unrebuttable in fact. See, e.g., JAMES D. Cox ET
AL., SECURmEs REGULATION 753 (2d ed. 1997) ("Because most publicly available in-
formation is reflected in market price, an investor's reliance on any public material
misrepresentations, therefore, may be presumed for purposes of a Rule 10b-5 ac-
tion."). The result is that the class of investors who can recover, and thus the aggre-
gate amount of recovery, is potentially very large.
'2 A standard example is In re Apple Computer Securities Litigation, 886 F.2d 1109 (9th
Cir. 1989). See infra note 157 and accompanying text; see also Robert A. Prentice &
John H. Langmore, Beware of Vaporware: Product Hype and the Securities Fraud Liability of
High-Tech Companies, 8 HARV.J.L. & TECH. 1, 4 (1994) (discussing product hype in rela-
tion to Rule lOb-5 and Apple). For efforts to relate this problem to the behavioral-
economics literature in terms of investor (that is, victim) decisionmaking within mar-
ket constraints, see Donald C. Langevoort, Theories, Assumptions, and Securities Regula-
tion: Market Efficiency Revisited, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 851 (1992). A noteworthy use of the
economic model that grows at least in part from the behaviorist perspective, noise
theory, is Baruch Lev & Meiring de Villiers, Stock Price Crashes and lOb-5 Damages: A Le-
gal, Economic, and Policy Analysis, 47 STAN. L. REV. 7 (1994).
" 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1997).
' Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (1995).
" See, e.g., Richard M. Phillips & Gilbert C. Miller, The Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act of 1995: Rebalancing Litigation Risks and Rewards for Class Action Plaintiffs, De-
fendants and Lauyers, 51 BUS. LAW. 1009, 1010-11, 1018 (1996) (stating that Congress
passed the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act in order to "reduc[e] the inci-
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My intuition is that stories like Intel, if accurate, have something
to say about this question. If Intel's business judgment was skewed by
predictable social forces, its economic self-portrait in disclosure about
its business prospects perhaps was as well.16 This insight helps us solve
a puzzle. From a rational standpoint, why would public companies
ever deliberately lie to investors when, because they are neither buy-
ing nor selling stock in the open market, there is nothing directly to
gain? When done intentionally, such activity is clearly unlawful and
policed fairly visibly both by the SEC and the private plaintiffs' class-
action bar. Yet cases of alleged deception seem to persist in large
numbers. Of course, anything but the most strained anthropomor-
phic conception of the firm leads us quickly to observe that corpora-
tions cannot tell lies-only their managers can. The question of mo-
tivation, then, becomes largely a managerial one. But conventional
economic analysis, at least, tells us that the interests of the company's
highest executives are usually (albeit not always) fairly closely aligned
with the ongoing interests of the firm, so that the question of why sen-
ior managers would engage in secondary-market deception remains
an interesting one. This is especially so when one considers that in
most bad-news scenarios, concealment simply delays the appreciation
of the truth rather than avoids it indefinitely,1 7 so that there are ad-
verse reputational as well as legal consequences from concealing the
truth.
The question has practical importance. From the standpoint of
securities-litigation policy, a conclusion that managers seldom have a
strong motive to lie under the prevailing regulatory framework (or
have such motive only in special, confined circumstances) might lead
us to doubt the merits of many of the fraud-on-the-market lawsuits
brought today. This would lend inferential support to the view that
the bulk of these cases are brought extortionately for their settlement
value, 8 and justify the kind of aggressive pruning of such actions that
dence of speculative class action suits, while still preserving meaningful class action
remedies for meritorious securities fraud claims").
'6 Because this analysis could not be done thoroughly and fairly from readily avail-
able sources, I have made no effort to determine whether Intel's publicity was actually
distorted.
17 See In reTime Warner Inc. Sec. Litig., 9 F.3d 259, 272-75 (2d Cir. 1993) (Winter,
J., dissenting) (arguing that the timing of bad news is irrelevant due to the efficient-
market hypothesis).
'8 CflJoseph A. Grundfest, Disimplying Private Rights of Action Under the Federal Securi-
ties Laws: The Commission's Authority, 107 HARV. L. REV. 963, 1017-24 (1994) (arguing
that the SEC should institute a rulemaking proceeding to explore, if, when, and how
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Congress chose in 1995. Conversely, identifying a broader set of
plausible motivations would suggest that there might well be plenty of
securities fraud around, suggesting the need for care in the reform
efforts lest too much deterrence be lost.
This Article seeks to provide a robust set of explanations for why
managers of a public corporation would mislead stock market inves-
tors either in their filings or in ongoing publicity efforts. Part I be-
gins by tracing the intellectual history of prior answers to this ques-
tion. As we shall see, there are very good-but confined-
explanations within the framework of conventional economic analy-
sis, particularly the thesis advocated by Jennifer Arlen and William
Camey' 9 that in the face of the sort of liability now imposed for securi-
ties fraud (which is almost exclusively vicarious), open-market lies are
predictable if (but largely only if) the top managers see themselves as
facing a "last period problem" wherein the disclosure of the truth
would result in insolvency and hence the loss of their jobs. The pri-
mary use of institutionalist organization theory here is simply to em-
phasize that the cost-benefit calculation that managers face when de-
ciding whether to lie is a complex one: Firms have multiple
constituencies, and lies that influence investors may really be directed
at other audiences (for example, customers or employees) in order to
prevent "runs" on external or internal resources.
We then turn to alternative stories that draw from materials that,
as noted above, blend the insights of sociology and social psychology
with economic analysis. Part II will move only slightly, if at all, from
the world of economics in utilizing this literature. Part II extends the
agency-cost analysis by raising the possibility that some forms of mis-
leading may be traceable not to the distortion of information by the
senior managers themselves but by arguably selfish distortions by
lower-level managers in the flow of information that moves up to sen-
ior management. The interesting question here is whether the result-
ing misinformation to the marketplace is securities fraud at all.
Part III is the heart of this Article and will make much greater use
of institutional theory as it has evolved in work on organizations out-
side of mainstream economics. Organizations are not the product of
private rights should be administratively disimplied). This is not the only inference, of
course: Deficiencies in the prevailing regulatory structure could also play a role.
'9 SeeJennifer H. Arlen & William J. Carney, Vicarious Liability for Fraud on Securities
Markets: Theory andEvidenc 1992 U. ILL. L. REV. 691, 724-27 (summarizing data which
show that fraud on the market generally occurs when agents are afraid that they are in
their last period of employment).
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preexisting or stable preferences of a group of individual actors; in-
stead, the structures and norms that have already evolved determine
what those actors prefer and how they make sense of what is happen-
ing around them. Here, we see the possibility that managers simply
might not recognize problems or risks because of systematic
"perceptual filters 20 that play crucial protective roles in the smooth
functioning of the firm. My most provocative hypothesis is that cor-
porate cultural biases, particularly optimistic ones, can be adaptive
mechanisms for encouraging trust and cooperation, and for deflect-
ing the selfishness-inducing last-period problem that arises in times of
stress and threat. If so, then such cultures should be commonplace
and persistent. This possibility is interesting especially when com-
bined with the problems specified in Parts I and II. The last-period
and information-flow questions become even more complex and fas-
cinating if we predict that cognitive biases affect the perceptions of
those involved in both the information flow and disclosure processes.
Though this Article is specifically directed at the problem of secu-
rities fraud, my broader aim is to invoke the new institutionalist litera-
ture in a way that makes clear its usefulness in a wide range of legal
settings,21 and thereby prompt a research agenda to build on this
genre of organization theory. The transaction-cost economics of
Oliver Williamson, Michael Jensen, and others has justifiably had a
profound influence on many legal subjects, not just corporate law.
One can hardly criticize this investment of intellectual capital, except
to the extent that it purports to be preemptive. Williamson and
See William H. Starbuck & Frances J. Milliken, Executives' Perceptual Filters: What
They Notice and How They Make Sens in THE EXECUTIVE EFFECr 35, 38 (Donald C.
Hambrick ed., 1988) (noting that explanations for organizational failure often center
on executives' failure to assess risk); see alsoJanice M. Beyer et al., The Selective Perception
of Managers Revisited, 40 AcAD. MGMT.J. 716, 734 (1997) (discussing different studies of
selective perception and concluding that managers' information processing is influ-
enced by their functional experience); Dennis A. Gioia, Symbols, Scripts and Sensemak-
ing: Creating Meaning in the Organizational Experience, in THE THINKING ORGANIZATION
49, 54-55 (Henry P. Sims, Jr. & Dennis A. Gioia eds., 1986) (stating that sense is made
of any current experience by imposing an existing framework on the current observa-
tion); sources cited infra note 110. For an extremely thorough review of the organiza-
tional-cognition literature (only a small portion of which deals with bias as opposed to
bounded rationality), with many references to business case studies, see James P.
Walsh, Managerial and Organizational Cognition: Notes from a Trip Down Memory Lane, 6
ORG. Sci. 280 (1995).
2' For one example of a call for this kind of connective work, see Edward L. Rubin,
The New Legal Process, the Synthesis of Discourse, and the Microanalysis of Institutions, 109
HARV. L. REV. 1398, 1416 (1996) (noting the convergence of economics, psychology,
sociology, and anthropology in institutional scholarship).
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Jensen, like many other economists, have explicitly acknowledged
that economists have something to learn from the sociologists and so-
cial psychologists who work in organizational theory (and vice versa,
of course), namely that an integrated institutional theory is desirable
but still in developmental infancy.2 But this acknowledgment has not
yet led legal scholars to anything resembling a comparable invest-
ment of efforts in exploring those other disciplines for useful in-
sights.23 To this end, Part IV will seek to generalize some of the ideas
about the motivations underlying corporate deception and extend
them to the more fundamental question of the responsiveness of cor-
porations to the dictates of tort and criminal law. Why might corpo-
rations not act "rationally" in avoiding socially harmful, unlawful ac-
tivities such as the production of dangerous products or the discharge
of toxic waste?
I. WHYLIE? THE PREVAILING ACCOUNTS
Securities "lies" come in a variety of forms. One can misrepresent
hard data (for example, lie about accounting results or a large con-
See George P. Baker et al., Compensation and Incentives: Practice vs. Theoy, 43 J.
FIN. 593, 615 (1988) ("Ultimately, it may be that psychologists, behaviorists, human
resource consultants, and personnel executives understand something about human
behavior and motivation that is not yet captured in our economic models."); Oliver E.
Williamson, Introduction to ORGANIZATION THEORY FROM CHESTER BARNARD TO THE
PRESENT AND BEYOND 3, 9 (Oliver E. Williamson ed., 1990) ("A fruitful dialogue be-
tween economics and organization is progressively taking shape."). The tribute to the
work of Chester Barnard organized by Williamson, see id., is an excellent dialogue be-
tween economists and a diverse group of other social scientists about the opportuni-
ties to advance organization theory via multidisciplinary work. In fact, economists
have been much quicker to incorporate these multidisciplinary perspectives into their
work than economics-oriented legal scholars. See Langevoort, supra note 12, at 857-72
(surveying use of social and psychological research in finance theory). Modern insti-
tutional economics is notable for its emphasis on historical and social theories (for
example, evolutionary and path-dependent development) even when it does not make
specific use of psychology or sociology. For law-oriented surveys, see RonaldJ. Gilson,
Corporate Governance and Economic Efficiency: When Do Institutions Matter2, 74 WASH. U.
L.Q. 327 (1996), and Rubin, supra note 21.
A predictable but crucial disclaimer is necessary here. There is no singular
model of organizational behavior in the new institutional literature: The underlying
theories and assumptions are controversial and often highly contingent. The field is
still relatively young. My aim here is to invoke that literature as the basis for promising
insights for legal scholars and decisionmakers, without claiming that it can be demon-
strated empirically to be more valid than the economists' competing model of instru-
mental rationality. Citations are offered not to claim that an assertion is clearly cor-
rect but rather to demonstrate respectable academic support for this institutional
literature's plausibility.
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tract that supposedly was agreed to with an important customer).
Most information in SEC filings is of this sort. But many lies that
24seemingly have the capacity to affect the stock markets2 are much
"softer'-involving subjective matters of opinion or inference.2 A
company will be charged with withholding adverse information about
whether a new product is likely to succeed, or whether cash flow is
sufficient to buffer the firm through hard times. The underlying
hard facts are interesting, that is, material, only for their predictive
usefulness. In this sense, an important portion of the question of why
companies allegedly lie to the stock markets can be recharacterized:
Why do companies allegedly distort construals of their future pros-
pects?26 That is our focus here.
The earliest literature on securities law rarely contained much
discussion of the motivational question. The increasing incidence of
cases involving misinformation disseminated to the secondary mar-
kets apparently led to an assumption that open-market fraud was a
problem, without much specification beyond anecdotes as to why or
how-even though, in the aftermath of the seminal Texas Gulf Sulphur
24 1 accept that many forms of managerial "spin" will be discounted by professional
investors. See infra text accompanying notes 196-97.
25 See COX ET AL., supra note 11, at 63-89 (discussing cases and materials dealing
with speculative information and materiality, and forward-looking information); Victor
Brudney, A Note on Materiality and Soft Information Under the Federal Securities Laws, 75
VA. L. REV. 723, 730-32 (1989) (discussing the concept of the materiality of soft or fu-
ture-oriented information in the law of required disclosure). The Supreme Court has
acknowledged that opinion-based disclosure can nonetheless be material, that is, the
sort of assertion on which a reasonable investor might reasonably rely. See Virginia
Bankshares v. Sandberg, 501 U.S. 1083, 1090-91 (1991) ("We think there is no room to
deny that a statement of belief by corporate directors about a recommended course of
action, or an explanation of their reasons for recommending it, can take on just that
importance [of materiality].").
26 This portion is quite large when one considers that fundamental valuation
techniques concentrate solely on the firm's expected stream of earnings, which is then
discounted to present value. Present and historic facts are simply useful in helping
estimate the future. See, e.g., WILLIAM A. KLEIN & JOHN C. COFFEE, JR., BUSINESS




litigation, this kind of fraud allegation in many ways became the
poster child for increasingly aggressive federal securities regulation.
By the mid-1970s, economic analysis of corporate and securities
regulation had taken hold, quickly turning what had been a relatively
moribund body of scholarship into one visibly prized in the acad-
emy.2 Given the strong emphasis on the comparative advantage of
nonlegal, market-based constraints in controlling harmful forms of
behavior, 0 scholars naturally asked hard questions about the likely in-
cidence of fraud and nondisclosure.
Two rational-actor insights are central to understanding the issue.
One is that active securities fraud, unlike other forms of wrongdoing
(like embezzlement, price fixing, and toxic dumping) is necessarily
public rather than private. Directly or indirectly, the insider must
speak through some medium, such as the business press or invest-
ment analysts, which can disseminate the fraud widely. Moreover, ac-
tive securities fraud is largely within the control of a small group of
senior managers, usually the only ones within the firm with enough
credibility and access to information to be able to move market par-
ticipants to cause significant price changes. In other words, a single
manager is unlikely to have the opportunity to move the market, even
if she wants to do so, without alerting other senior managers, who
have the capacity to counter or deny the falsehood quickly. As such,
one would expect that most successful frauds are committed with the
27 See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 864 (2d Cir. 1968) (in banc)
("We conclude... that, having established that the release was issued in a manner
reasonably calculated to affect the market price of TGS stock and to influence the in-
vesting public, we must remand to the district court to decide whether the release was
misleading to the reasonable investor and if found to be misleading, whether the
court in its discretion should issue the injunction the SEC seeks.").
2' See David S. Ruder, Texas Gulf Sulphur-The Second Round: Privity and State of
Mind in Rule 10b-5 Purchase and Sale Cases, 63 NW. U. L. REV. 423, 423 (1968) ("Serious
questions regarding the extent to which liability should be imposed for violation of
Securities and Exchange Commission Rule 10b-5 have been raised by the recent Sec-
ond Circuit decision in SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co."). Notwithstanding greater con-
servatism in securities-law policy, the abandonment of privity has survived recent chal-
lenge. SeeMcGann v. Ernst &Young, 102 F.3d 390, 397 (9th Cir. 1996) (applying Texas
Gulf Sulphur to an allegedly fraudulent audit report and concluding that "an account-
ing firm acts 'in connection with' securities trading when it produces an audit re-
port").
29 See Roberta Romano, Metapolitics and Corporate Law Reform, 36 STAN. L. REV. 923,
923 (1984) ("Until recently, corporate law has been an uninspiring field for research
even to some of its most astute students.").
" See sources cited supra note 1.
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involvement or acquiescence of the entire management group of the
corporation.
The other insight is that, collectively at least, this control group
has a natural incentive toward candor. Senior management's group
interests are contractually aligned with the long-term success of the
firm as reflected in its share price, and the firm benefits from a repu-
tation for honesty. Since few problems can be concealed indefinitely,
especially in an environment of mandatory disclosure, with the inter-
vention of outside accountants and lawyers as well as aggressive scru-
tiny by professional analysts, the reputational risk of concealment,
both to the firm and its top executives, is palpable.
To be sure, special circumstances exist that could tempt this
group to choose the risk. The most obvious is the possibility of in-
sider trading-well recognized today as the best motivational story a
plaintiff can tell to justify a circumstantial case for fraud on the mar-
ket.3 There is an immediate and potentially immense pecuniary gain
for managers if they can buy or sell in advance of a market move-
ment, tempting them to delay their truth-telling in order to fully ex-
ploit the informational advantage. But we must be cautious about the
plausibility of this kind of story. Given that some concerted effort by
senior managers is usually required to distort the market successfully,
there are difficult coordination problems that act as natural deter-
rents to this kind of conspiracy.3 This kind of insider trading is un-
ambiguously illegal and readily detectable when done on the kind of
large scale necessary to support a broad conspiracy. 4
SI See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Mandatory Disclosure and the Protec-
tion of Investors, 70 VA. L. REV. 669, 673-77 (1984) (describing management's interest in
its own trustworthiness).
32 See, e.g., Rubinstein v. Collins, 20 F.3d 160, 169-70 (5th Cir. 1994) (noting the
presumptive materiality of insider information). See generally Jordan Eth & Michael
Dicke, Insider Stock Sales in Rule lOb-5 Corporate Disclosure Cases: Separating the Innocent
from the Suspicious, 1 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 97, 98 (1994) (discussing corporate disclo-
sure cases). Similarly, there would be an obvious pecuniary motivation to executives
who are about to receive or cash in on stock options or comparable forms of compen-
sation, or who wish to avoid the threat of a corporate takeover. A recent study finds
little evidence of management's potentially manipulative timing of publicity as a
means of maximizing compensation awards. See David Yermack, Good Timing. CEO
Stock Option Awards and Company News Announcements, 52 J. FIN. 449, 473 (1997)
(arguing against the theory that managers manipulate the timing of their news an-
nouncements).
"' Given the risk of detection, many executives who would otherwise be privy to the
fraud would lack the sufficient self-interest to participate.
34 See, e.g., DONALD C. LANGEvOORT, INSIDER TRADING § 1.04, at 1-23 (1997)
(discussing how suspicious market-price movements can trigger SEC investigations).
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A more benign kind of temptation to lie or conceal information
comes when there is some special corporate need to preserve secrecy.-"
The best-known example here is the preliminary merger negotiation,
addressed in the Supreme Court's Basic Inc. v. Levinson decision. On
the not unrealistic assumption that preliminary negotiations are more
likely to occur and succeed if they proceed without the knowledge of
potential competitors for corporate control, companies have a natural
incentive to keep investors in the dark (and foreseeably hurt some
relatively small category of sellers) in pursuit of the overriding aim of
maximizing firm value. One can easily imagine other analogous ex-
amples of this sort of deception. Scholars have debated the proper
posture toward this situation; however, the Court in Basic made clear
that utilitarian lying to cover up the negotiations may be illegal, s7 even
though mere silence probably is not.35 Once we assume illegality, 9 we
must again puzzle over why managers would rationally choose to run
both the reputational and legal risk associated with lying when (the
' See Marcel Kahan, Games, Lies, and Securities Fraud, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 750, 753
(1992) (describing a hypothetical company's incentive to keep its strategies secret).
485 U.S. 224, 226 (1988) (discussing the Securities Exchange Act as it applies to
preliminary merger discussions). There are many other cases in which deceiving some
other audience was the primary objective of the misstatement or omission. See, eg.,
Heit v. Weitzen, 402 F.2d 909, 911 (2d Cir. 1968) (failing to disclose overcharges on
government contracts). Basic generated an interesting debate about whether corpora-
tions should have greater freedom to lie under the securities laws. See Ian Ayres, Back
to Basics: RegulatingHow Corporations Speak to the Market, 77VA. L. REV. 945, 946 (1991)
(asking whether "corporations should be allowed to lie to the market"); Kahan, supra
note 35, at 752 (noting that securities law may unfairly burden a company's strategic
planning); Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Good Finance, Bad Economics: An
Analysis of the Fraud-on-the-Market Theory, 42 STAN. L. REv. 1059, 1062 (1990) (discussing
the gaps which the Basic decision leaves in the market-fraud theory).
-7 485 U.S. at 239 ("Whether merger discussions in any particular case are material
depends on the facts.").
m See id. at 240 n.17 ("[W]e think that creating an exception to a regulatory
scheme founded on a prodisclosure legislative philosophy, because complying with
the regulation might be 'bad for business,' is a role for Congress, not this Court.").
*9 Of course, the question of motivation depends on the nature of the liability
scheme in question. If there is no liability at all for securities fraud, then the question
is a simple calculus of whether the competitive benefits of secrecy exceed the reputa-
tional harm. If we assume firm liability, then the question is whether these benefits
exceed the sum of the liability and reputational harm. In turn, the predicted liability
costs would take into account the less-than-perfect incidence of a lawsuit and the fact
that such suits can commonly be settled for far less than their face value. See, e.g.,
Janet Cooper Alexander, Do the Merits Matter?: A Study of Settlements in Securities Class
Actions, 43 STAN. L. REv. 497, 524 (1991) ("[I]t seems clear thatsecurities class actions
are resolved by adjudication significantly less often than are other civil cases.").
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special problem of insider trading aside) they have so little to gain di-
rectly.
Here is where Arlen and Carney make their contribution.0 They
hypothesize that so long as the interests of senior management are
indeed aligned with the long-term interests of the firm, the incentive
structure makes the probability of intentional deception somewhat
unlikely.41 There will be one class of cases, however, where the moti-
vational dynamics change considerably. If the senior management
group believes that it faces the threat of company insolvency, with the
high probability of group firing, then it will see the tradeoff for not
lying as one of the threatened loss of salary, bonuses, and perquisites,
plus any personal reputational damage resulting from such a termina-
tion.42 That is a draconian threat indeed, and even a rational actor
will be tempted to avoid it through concealment, either to buy time to
create the possibility of a turnaround or simply to milk their positions
for as long as possible. 43 Arlen and Garney note that the legal deter-
rence is minimal for selfish managers in light of the prevailing doc-
trinal regime's strong bias toward vicarious liability,44 wherein nearly
all settlements and judgments are paid either by the company itself or
its director and officer liability insurer-not by the managers them-
selves." Indeed, advocating a shift from vicarious to agent liability, a
contrast with the orthodox preference in the law-and-economics lit-
erature, is the central normative message of their article.
We now have an account for some incidence of securities fraud,
but the implication is that securities fraud is limited to special kinds
of situations: particularly, when there is fear of being on the verge of
40 See Arlen & Carney, supra note 19. For an endorsement of their view, see
Reinier Kraakman et al., When Are Shareholder Suits in Shareholder Interests?, 82 GEO. L.J.
1733, 1760 n.80 (1994).
" See Arlen & Carney, supra note 19, at 702-03 (describing market-based con-
straints).
42 See id. at 693 (noting that "Fraud on the Market usually occurs when agents fear
themselves to be in their last period of employment").
" See id. at 694 (arguing that generally fraud is committed by managers who want
to conceal "that the firm is ailing in an attempt to save theirjobs and their investments
in the firm").
4 See id. (arguing that agent liability is a better deterrent of fraud than enterprise
liability).
's One recent study shows that only 0.4% of the average settlement is paid by the
human wrongdoers; the remainder is from the corporate treasury or insurance (the
premiums for which were paid by the company). See FREDERICK C. DUNBAR ET AL,




bankruptcy or some other last period, or when there is a strong com-
petitive need for secrecy.4' The problem with this theory, however, is
that it does not provide a compelling motivational story for the major-
ity of cases that make up the class-action practice today, and that in-
volve the management's concealment of product defects or the com-
pany's financial difficulties that are unlikely to lead to insolvency.
One need not invoke much alternative organizational theory to
appreciate the thesis of Arlen and Carney. One suspects, however,
that in one respect a company may have a more pervasive incentive to
lie than Arlen and Carney imply. One of the primary lessons of the
institutionalist literature-hardly inconsistent with modern economic
analysis-is that firms operate in complex ecologies in which they
compete for both legitimacy and scarce resources. The relevant
"stakeholder" network includes the government, employees, custom-
ers, suppliers, investors, and so forth. The management of the busi-
ness requires constant care of all these relationships and occasional
tradeoff of interests. Under these circumstances, it would not be sur-
prising to find situations in which trading off credibility with (perhaps
even the risk of liability to4") investors for some profit-enhancing gain
in some other area could be a rational choice.
When a company issues a press release, there are many different
groups of audience, and no public form of communication is capable
of simultaneously delivering one message to investors while sending a
completely different message to another group. The financial press
(for example, the Wall Street Journal or Business Week) is read by a wide
variety of economic actors. The optimal form of publicity is one that
best mediates the company's investor-relations interests with the full
range of other business needs, adjusted to reflect whatever liability
and reputational risks are associated with misleading any one class of
actors. In the eyes of many students of business organizations, for ex-
ample, there is a social imperative to style corporate publicity in a way
" Arlen and Carney provide an empirical study of recent class-action litigation
(excluding merger and acquisition activities) that purports to support this thesis. See
Arlen & Carney, supra note 19, at 720-34. They categorize a sample of recent cases and
argue that a large portion can be fit into the "last period" category. Seeid. at 725-27.
17 See, e.g., JEFFREY PFEFFER & GERALD R. SALANCIK, THE EXTERNAL CONTROL OF
ORGANIZATIONs 2 (1978) (arguing that because the success of an organization de-
pends on its ability to acquire resources, it must contend with the environment in
which its resources are controlled); SCOTT, supra note 6, at 76-94 (discussing the the-
ory of open systems).
's This is especially the case if the expected harm from being caught is signifi-
cantly less than the full social cost of the fraud. Seesupra note 39.
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that creates a strong image of confidence and control over the com-
pany's environment. 49 Failure to do this results in a "run" on re-
sources, a cascading loss of support that can endanger the particular
project or, in extreme cases, the firm itself.50 We might go so far as to
predict that companies that are not careful and unified in assuring
that all its external publicity conforms to the desired image will risk
signaling weakness. Under these circumstances, an excessively opti-
mistic "face" of the corporation could readily become the norm, and
any corporation that defected from the norm by being entirely candid
would suffer a penalty if the stock market had so internalized an ex-
pectation of overoptimism that the truthful statement was taken as
covering up a situation worse than depicted. This suggests some
merit to the recent claim in a securities-fraud opinion by Judge
Richard Posner that "[w]here puffing is the order of the day, literal
truth can be profoundly misleading."5'
49 See, e.g., Jeffrey Pfeffer, Management as Symbolic Action: The Creatidn and Mainte-
nance of Organizational Paradigms, in 3 RESEARCH IN ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR 1, 4
(L.L. Cummings & Barry M. Staw eds., 1981) (stating that "it is the task of manage-
ment to provide explanations, rationalizations, and legitimation for the activities un-
dertaken in the organization"); Gerald R. Salancik & James t Meindl, Corporate Attri-
butions as Strategic Illusions of Management Control 29 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 238, 251-53 (1984)
(examining reasons given by CEOs to explain corporate performance); Barry M. Staw
et al., The Justification of Organizational Performane; 28 ADMIN. SC. Q. 582, 594-98
(1983) (discussing studies measuring justification of organizational performance).
For a more critical perspective, see Charles R. Schwenk, Illusions of Management Con-
trol?: Effects of Self-Serving Attributions on Resource Commitments and Confidence in Manage-
ment, 43 HUM. REL. 333, 334 (1990) (describing experiments to determine the "effects
of self serving attributions on confidence in management and resource commitment
decisions").
so See Robert I. Sutton, Organizational Decline Processes: A Social Psychological Perspec-
tiv in 12 RESEARCH IN ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR, 205, 220-21 (Barry M. Staw & L.L.
Cummings eds., 1990) (stating that the "deterioration in an organization's environ-
mental resource base causes a decrease in the flow of resources into the organization,
especially financial resources, leading to decreased internal financial resources" and
.emphasiz[ing] the role of a tainted organizational image in hampering the flow of
resources from key external exchange partners"); Robert I. Sutton & Anita L.
Callahan, The Stigma of Bankruptcy: Spoiled Organizational Image and Its Management, 30
AcAD. MGMT. J. 405, 431 (1987) ("The stigma of Chapter 11 is proposed to cause key
organizational audiences to respond with a set of five negative reactions: disengage-
ment, reduction in the quality of participation, bargaining for more favorable ex-
change relationships, denigration via rumor, and denigration via confrontation.").
For variations in the way in which firms react to financial threats, see William Ocasio,
The Enactment of Economic Adversity: A Reconciliation of Failure Induced Change and Threat
Rigidity, in 17 RESEARCH IN ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR 287 (L.L. Cummings & Barry
M. Staw eds., 1995).
51 Eisenstadt v. Centel Corp., 113 F.3d 738, 746 (7th Cir. 1997). The idea that a
norm of financial beautification through artificial accounting conventions can cause
[Vol. 146: 101
ORGANIZED ILLUSIONS
In moderate form, the multiple-audience problem could well be
the story behind the "product fraud" cases that loom so large as secu-
rities class actions. Many cases-In re Apple Computer Securities Litiga-
tion is a well-known example-have been based on a series of public
statements regarding some product under development which has
been greeted with great enthusiasm by the investing public but which
then flops in the market. Some evidence is then found that problems
were known to at least some managers at the time the optimism was
being expressed. If we simply view this through the investor-company
relationship lens, the fake optimism may seem puzzling, at least from
a rational perspective.
But it is not so puzzling if we see the false publicity as directed to
other audiences. Disclosure by the company of problems could well
trigger competitors' gaining advantages with retailers and customers
(for example, loss of anticipated shelf space). Unless the problems
are already common knowledge among employees, there could be a
slippage in internal motivation and morale. In other words, the dis-
closure could become a self-fulfilling prophecy, dooming whatever
remaining chances of success the project has. More generally, disclo-
sure of possibly insolvable problems and risks runs counter to the de-
sired image of control treated by business theorists as so important in
the competition for resources. Of course, there are possibly more
selfish motivations at play here as well. Admission that an established
project may be a failure is embarrassing to certain senior managers,
threatening the prevailing political structure of the firm. However,
we cannot assume that the desire to mislead is necessarily selfish.
Nothing in the foregoing suggests that we should not attach liabil-
ity consequences to these utilitarian sorts of lies. Although there has
been a lively debate in the literature about how investors would view a
companies to conform for fear of being penalized if they do not is explored in Claire
A. Hill, Why Financial Appearances Might Matter: An Explanation for "Dirty Pooling" and
Some Other Types of Financial Cosmetics, 22 DEL.J. CORP. L. 141, 179-80 (1997).
5 886 F.2d 1109 (9th Cir. 1989); see also Dale E. Barnes, Jr. & Constance E. Bagley,
Great Expectations: Risk Management Through Risk Disclosur4 1 STAN.J.L. BUS. & FIN. 155,
170-71 (1994) (discussing consequences of public statements made in Apple); Prentice
& Langmore, supra note 12, at 1 (stating that after Appe, "the point is made: poten-
tially huge securities liability can arise from statements made by corporate officials to
promote their companies' products").
's I do not want to overstate my claim here, especially given the conclusions of Part
III which suggest that managers are not likely to be fully conscious of the biased na-
ture of their perceptions.
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rule that permitted a company to lie in order to enhance value,54 the
courts have made clear that investors harmed by deliberate deception
must be compensated, no matter how noble the reason.55 What is
underscored, however, is the way in which the self-fulfilling prophecy
consequence of candor can impose second-level costs on business
firms, which are ultimately borne by investors."" If public expressions
of efficacy and control are frustrated, corporations may suffer com-
petitively. Therefore, we should at least be careful that the compen-
sation demanded in the name of securities regulation to the injured
class is indeed limited to their real injuries, lest there be excessive de-
terrence. For reasons explored elsewhere, I suspect that the prevail-
ing compensatory scheme is unnecessarily generous to those who fall
into the plaintiff class, making the self-fulfilling prophecy concern an
especially serious one.
" See supra note 36 (discussing cases in which deceiving another audience was the
primary objective).
ss See, e.g., Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 240 n.17 (1988) ("[W]e think that
creating an exception to a regulatory scheme founded on a prodisclosure legislative
philosophy, because complying with the regulation may be 'bad for business,' is a role
for Congress, not this Court."); Heit v. Weitzen, 402 F.2d 909, 913 (2d Cir. 1968)
("'Rule lOb5 is violated whenever assertions are made.., in a manner reasonably cal-
culated to influence the investing public, e.g., by means of the financial media.... if
such assertions are false or misleading or are so incomplete as to mislead irrespective
of whether the issuance of the [press] release was motivated by corporate officials for
ulterior purposes.'" (quoting SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 862 (2d
Cir. 1968))).
The indirect costs of too much candor is well explored in Edmund W. Kitch, The
Theory and Practice of Securities Disclosure, 61 BROOK. L. REV. 763 (1995). See also San Le-
andro Emergency Med. Group Profit Sharing Plan v. Philip Morris Cos., 75 F.3d 801,
809-10 (2d Cir. 1996) ("We are concerned.., about interpreting the securities laws to
force companies to give their competitors advance notice of sensitive pricing informa-
tion.").
57 See Donald C. Langevoort, Capping Damages for Open-Market Securities Fraud, 38
ARIz. L. REv. 639, 663-64 (1996) ("There is little doubt that courts have fashioned
damage remedies in open-market fraud cases on the assumption that all frauds have
victims, and all victims deserve full compensation. But it is too easy to lose sight of the
fact that in the capital marketplace, questions of what constitutes fraud, how to prove
it, and who is really a victim have no precise answers."); see alsoJanet Cooper Alexan-
der, Rethinking Damages in Securities Class Actions, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1487, 1487 (1996)
(arguing that damages in class-action securities suits are misaligned with the goals of
securities litigation); Arlen & Carney, supra note 19, at 694 (arguing that enterprise
liability results in large wealth transfers from one group of innocent investors to an-
other that are inconsistent with the goal of optimal loss spreading and that the goal of
just compensation cannotjustify enterprise liability because the burden of the liability
ultimately falls on innocent shareholders); Paul G. Mahoney, Precaution Costs and the
Law of Fraud in Impersonal Markets, 78 VA. L. REv. 623, 625 (1992) (arguing that the
fraud-on-the-market theory "either impose[s] additional liability without additional
social benefit, or divide[s] up a fixed recovery among a greater set of investors to the
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There is a related message about vicarious liability. Arlen and
Carney argue that if selfish last-period behavior is at the root of most
predictable forms of fraud on the market, then vicarious liability-
which visits liability on innocent shareholders of the firm-makes lit-
tle sense. That is true. On the other hand, if some more sizable
category of frauds really are business-motivated, then vicarious liabil-
ity (at least if in an optimal amount) has far more to recommend it.59
II. EXTENDING THE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS: THE PROBLEM OF
INFORMATION FLOW
A. The Problem of Corporate Knowledge
One subject on which there is substantial agreement over the full
range of organization studies is that "upward" information flow poses
a challenge for coherent corporate decisionmaking.60 Information is
highly decentralized in business organizations. Especially when we
focus on information and inferences that are not readily quantifi-
able-for example, customer reactions to new products, how well
products are proceeding through the research and development
pipeline-relatively low- or mid-level managerial personnel will have
detriment of those investors who require recovery in order to minimize precaution-
taking"). The primary reasons are that most settlements and judgments are funded
out of other innocent investors' pockets, rather than those of the primary wrongdoers,
and the measure of damages fails to account for the windfall gains that many noncul-
pable investors receive from the fraud.
53 See Arlen & Carney, supra note 19, at 720 (arguing that holding the agent rather
than the corporation liable for fraud on the market will provide a more just and effec-
tive deterrent).
'9 It seems clear that managers-boards of directors as well as insiders-would be
sensitive to the risk of firm liability in making judgments about whether to lie in the
interest of shareholders in merger, product development, and other "competitive"
situations. Given the conflict of interest, however, Arlen and Carney are clearly right
in seeing the need for agent liability as well.
Information flow is a major concern in Kenneth Arrow's analysis of organiza-
tions. See KENNETHJ. ARROW, THE LIMITS OF ORGANIZATION 33-43, 33 (1974) (stating
that "[t]he purpose of organizations is to exploit the fact that many (virtually all) deci-
sions require the participation of many individuals for their effectiveness" and discuss-
ing the costs of communication channels as influenced by activities of the individual
rather than the collection of information). For a more conventional economics per-
spective, emphasiiing how informational asymmetry can be combatted in principal-
agent relationships within the firm, see PAUL MILGROM &JOHN ROBERTS, ECONOMICS,
ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT 100-03 (1992), and WILLIAMSON, supra note 2. See
also MERRrTr B. Fox, FINANCE AND INDUSTRIAL PERFORMANCE IN A DYNAMIC ECONOMY
118 (1987) ("Ideas relating to the.., financial decisions of top management.... are
likely to be processed as they make their way toward the top managers of a firm.").
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61
the most immediate access to useful information. Corporations
must devise some kind of communications system that enables impor-
tant data to move upward to the proper decisionmaker, without caus-
ing all information of any arguable relevance to be moved to the
desks of a sequence of busy supervisors. Corporate hierarchies serve
this role,62 with varying systems of routines, norms, and philosophies
to customize the information flow in any given firm. One common
system is to teach managers to distinguish between the unusual and
the usual, and limit information flow to the former.63 The currently
celebrated norm of "participatory management" is another way of ad-
dressing the problem."
The difficulty, of course, is that if material information must pass
through a number of relay points in a hierarchy, the message can
change (and lose accuracy) in the process. One need not assume any
systematic cognitive bias at all. As the children's game of telephone
inevitably illustrates, the mere act of retransmission makes it increas-
ingly probable that the final message will not be the same as the one
first sent. But economists and others assume that moral-hazard prob-
lems are severe here: Subordinate managers will be tempted to vary
the message to conform to their self-interest.6
6' See, e.g., Jane E. Dutton et al., Reading the Wind. How Middle Managers Assess the
Context for Selling Issues to Top Managers, 18 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 407, 407 (1997) ("It is
often middle managers rather than the top managers who have their hands on the
'pulse of the organization.'").
612 See generally Roy Radner, Hierarchy: The Economics of Managing, 30J. ECON. LITER-
ATURE 1382, 1387-1401 (1992) (discussing corporate hierarchies).
See id. at 1403 (describing the reporting rule of "management by exception").
See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Participatory Management Within a Theory of the Firm, 21
J. CORP. L. 657, 680-96 (1996) (explaining the economic function of participatory
management in the context of the theory of the firm). By giving lower-level managers
and employees a role in company deliberations, more effective communication oc-
curs. See id. at 692 (noting that participatory management encourages "team spirit"
and commitment to the group which, in turn, encourages productivity).
See, e.g., ARROW, supra note 60, at 75 ("The efficiency loss due to informational
overload is increased by the tendency in that situation to filter information in accor-
dance with one's preconceptions."); RICHARD M. CYERT & JAMES G. MARCH, A BE-
HAVIORAL THEORY OF THE FIRM 81-82, 109-10 (1963) (considering the effects of "both
conscious and unconscious bias in expectations" on information); Dutton et al., supra
note 61, at 409 (stating that "people tend to control... information about themselves
that will affect others' perceptions of them"); Martha S. Feldman &James G. March,
Information in Organizations as Signal and Symbol 26 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 171, 176 (1981)
("Information is gathered and communicated in a context of conflict of interest and
with consciousness of potential decision consequences. Often, information is pro-
duced in order to persuade someone to do something."); R. Joseph Monsen, Jr. &
Anthony Downs, A Theoy of Large Managerial Firms, 73J. POL. ECON. 221, 236 (1965)
(concluding that "[m]anagers are 'economic men' who desire to maximize their own lifetime
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We should pause here to appreciate the full extent of the diffi-
culty. The employees with the most immediate access to basic infor-
mation are almost always line personnel with a range of operational
duties, not just the role of informational monitor. Salespeople, for
instance, have the best sense of customer attitudes. The combination
of operational responsibilities and reporting duties creates an obvious
conflict of interest. Compensation is often subjective and set by the
immediate supervisor6 (though sales is one area where performance-
based compensation through commissions and quota systems is
commonplace). For that reason alone, the natural reporting tempta-
tion is to transmit information in a way that minimizes the potential
for blaming oneself for bad news, and to convey as much good news
as possible to the extent that the information can be attributed to the
source-consistent, of course, with a general desire to have a reputa-
tion for credibility with one's superiors. A further complication
comes from the organization of many managers into teams, with no
clear assignment of reporting responsibility to a particular member
and ready excuses for treating the handling of bad news as a team-
mate's problem, rather than one's own.
The highly situational incentive to distort is exacerbated by the
promotion and termination structures commonly found in large cor-
porations. Especially for junior managers on the executive track,
there is a rapid rotation of responsibilities. Rarely does one stay in
one role for more than two years, and tangible evidence of skill and
loyalty must be demonstrated repeatedly to justify promotion and
incomes" and that large firms develop bureaucratic structures that "tend to ... provide
biased information to top management which reflects its own desires and ideas too
strongly"). Jack Coffee has explored the information-flow problem as it relates to the
potential for concealing corporate criminal activity. See Coffee, supra note 4, at 1131-
47 (noting that adverse information relating to contingent liabilities appears not to
reach the board until a crisis of scandal has become unavoidable); see also STONE, supra
note 4, at 201-09 (discussing the corporation's information net). On insider trading
and information flow, see RobertJ. Haft, The Effect of Insider Trading Rulas on the Internal
Efficiency ofthe Large Corporation, 80 MICH. L. REv. 1051 (1982).
Noteworthy here, as recognized even in conventional economic analysis, is the
tendency to report to the boss what one perceives the boss wants to hear. See Canice
Prendergast, A Theory of "Yes Men", 83 AM. ECON. REV. 757, 769 (1993) ("If workers are
rewarded on a subjective basis, they may distort their behavior toward what they feel
their superiors want to hear.").
F7 Obviously, bad news that will be discovered shortly anyway cannot be concealed
without paying a price in terms of future credibility. But bad news comes in many dif-
ferent guises; some may not be discovered for some time to come, and may be quite
ambiguous in causal terms when it does. In these situations, impression management
can have its desired effect.
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avoid termination or a career slowdown. This places special impor-
tance on the need to accentuate the positive and to distort bad news,
and introduces a clear-cut long-term/short-term bias.6 To an ambi-
tious manager facing a series of such "probationary crucibles,"69 ad-
verse information that would taint his or her candidacy but will not be
realized more broadly within the organization until that manager has
either moved up or out-at a time when any attribution of personal
responsibility is either impossible or unlikely because so many possi-
ble causes intervene over time-should be concealed or distorted.
As economists are quick to point out, none of this comes as a sur-
prise,70 and thus efficiency-driven firms must try to counter the prob-
lem. There are techniques to try to induce more accurate reporting.
The prevailing system of accounting and auditing, for example, has,
as one function, the creation of an internal financial-control system
that is independent of the moral hazard of line-personnel reporting.
Such systems, however, are expensive and workable only with respect
to certain kinds of independently verifiable data (and are probably
more subjective and subject to failure than we would like to think) .7
Other monitoring interventions are also possible, but again tend to
68 See Elizabeth A. Mannix & George F. Loewenstein, The Effects ofInterfirm Mobility
and Individual Versus Group Decision Making on Managerial Time Horizons, 59 ORG.
BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 371, 374 (1994) ("High levels of [interfirm] mo-
bility uncouple managers' personal gains from the long-term performance of the
company for which they are employed at a particular point in time."). This is espe-
cially true in organizations that are team-based, where the managers who have insti-
tuted a poor policy are elsewhere when the impact is felt and there is no good mecha-
nism for assigning blame retrospectively.
69 ROBERTJACKALL, MORAL MAZEs 40 (1988). Jackall's work is very interesting in
this regard, emphasizing the complex relationship among promotion patterns, infor-
mation flow, and moral judgments. His relatively pessimistic conclusion is that the
interplay of these factors biases the corporate hierarchy toward those who are rela-
tively plastic in their ethical thinking-good team players who know how to manage
information and not threaten teammates and superiors in how they handle what they
observe. See id. at 56 (describing the essential characteristics of the "team" player); see
also Frederick B. Bird & James A. Waters, The Moral Muteness of Managers, CAL. MGMT.
REv., Fall 1989, at 73, 76 (noting that managers' interactions are influenced by their
concerns that "moral talk will threaten organizational harmony, organizational effi-
ciency, and their own reputation for power and effectiveness").
70 For an overview, see Radner, supra note 62.
71 Indeed, even in accounting-where the monitoring structure is most formal-
ized-the risk of "audit failures" for a variety of reasons (not simply because the mis-
behavior was well concealed, but because of compromised independence, conflict of
interest, and cognitive bias) is far from trivial. See Timothy J. Fogarty, The Imagery and
Reality of Peer Review in the U.S.: Insights from Institutional Theory, 21 ACcr. ORG. & SOC'v
243, 251 (1996) (addressing the discrepancies between promises of peer reviews and
their actual delivery by accountants).
(Vol. 146: 101
ORGANIZED ILLUSIONS
be costly both in terms of personnel and morale; overly intrusive
monitoring may well be inconsistent with other important traits
needed in a competitive environment, such as trust, aggressiveness,
and risk-taking.2 One can also try to encourage multiple, independ-
ent information tracks. Though these can be useful, they simply in-
crease ambiguity if differing interpretations of the same subjects filter
upward, and are no less subject to selfish manipulation.
Thus, it is not surprising that most corporations opt for some
variation of the traditional hierarchical structure, which depends on a
mix of contractual incentives and cultural norms to induce appropri-
ate behavior at each level. Each superior monitors both the opera-
tion and the information-reporting performance of the subordinate
manager, and adjusts compensation and promotion accordingly.73
There is likely to be much emphasis on "responsiveness" and endless
team meetings and cultural displays about the need for accurate and
timely information flow. But one cannot be overly optimistic about
the outcome: The moral-hazard problem can be dampened through
structure and contract but not eliminated. Consider the position of a
manager who both supervises a team and reports to a series of higher-
level managers. In seeking accurate information from subordinates,
she must keep in mind that the information may not reflect well on
her to the extent that it is subject to retransmission upward. Under
these circumstances, the supervisor may communicate that there are
certain things she wants to hear and certain things she does not.74
Indeed, she may well encourage subordinates to keep negative infor-
mation from her in order to preserve the ability to deny responsibility
should problems later be uncovered. 75 This could be accomplished
See Carol M. Rose, Trust in the Mirror of Betraya4 75 B.U. L. REV. 531, 540-41
(1995) ("[P]eople do not like to be monitored. They may well mistake monitoring and
questioning for distrust...."); Sim B. Sitkin & Darryl Stickel, The Road to Hell: TheI)y-
namics of Distrust in an Era of Quality, in TRUST IN ORGANIZATIONS 196, 209 (Roderick
M. Kramer & Tom R. Tyler eds., 1996) ("[H]ighly formalized management control
systems can lead to escalating distrust...."). The point made in this literature is that
monitoring is a signal of distrust, which both affects the subordinates' level of com-
mitment, and shifts time and attention to managing the impressions of the monitor
rather than doing "real work."
7s Indeed, if the monitors observe operational success (for example, profitability),
the chance of disciplining a manager based on faulty information reporting may be
minimal.
74 See Prendergast, supra note 66, at 757 (illustrating incentives for workers to con-
form to the opinions of their superiors).
75 See, e.g., Larry D. Browning & Robert Folger, Communication Under Conditions of
Litigation Risk: A Grounded Theory of Plausible Deniability in the Iran-Contra Affair, in THE
LEGAiSTIC ORGANIATION 251, 251-52 (Sim B. Sitkin & Robert J. Bies eds., 1994)
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through an explicit injunction, or, more likely, through the cultiva-
tion of a reputation for "shooting the messenger"-acting punitively
against subordinates who do not act with discretion when transmit-
76ting accurate, adverse information upward.
Even if a senior manager made a credible statement that she
wanted accurate information reporting (and was prepared to enforce
the rule through sanctions), it is unlikely that this would necessarily
trigger conforming behavior below. The problem of termination and
compensation remains in an environment of informational asymme-
try where monitoring reporting accuracy is often impossible. In other
words, we have a large-scale replication of Arlen and Carney's last-
period problem 77 in each nested layer of the hierarchy. To the extent
that any given employee fears the possibility of being fired or dead-
ended in light of a candid portrayal of the situation (a constant in
fast-track managerial pyramids), distortion or concealment becomes a
dominant strategy regardless of long-term promises, threats, or repu-
tational incentives.78
(discussing the building of a wall around President Reagan by subordinates so he
could plausibly deny liability); Jack Katz, Concerted Ignorance: The Social Construction of
Cover-Up, 8 URB. LiFE 295, 298-305 (1979) (discussing how cover-ups are established
and maintained in large scale organizations through "concerted ignorance" by superi-
ors and subordinates).
76 Here we once again encounter a particular problem with respect to information
that is either ambiguous or incomplete (the latter being commonplace when there is
substantial diffusion of responsibility within the firm). The employee does not know
for sure whether it is serious, and runs the risk of considerable blame if she raises it
and it turns out to be groundless. In that situation, employees may choose to withhold
key pieces of information that, if made available to the higher-ups, could be pieced
together and dealt with.
77 See supra notes 40-44 and accompanying text.
78 Cf. Keith C. Brown et al., Of Tournaments and Temptations: An Analysis of Manage-
rial Incentives in the Mutual Fund Industry, 51 J. FIN. 85, 90-93 (1996) (offering evidence
of comparable short-term opportunism notwithstanding reputational incentives). We
need not assume that these distortions are in bad faith. One of the most noted theo-
rists in this area, Chris Argyris, argues that the desire to avoid unpleasant confronta-
tion and maintain positive relationships in organizations ultimately leads to organiza-
tional defensiveness: Leaders communicate (implicitly) that certain matters are
"undiscussable," and information flow thereby becomes skewed as communication
both up and down the organization chart avoids treating these issues. Problems there-
fore disappear from managerial awareness until crisis, and effective corporate learning
is frustrated. See CHRIs ARGYRIS, OVERCOMING ORGANIZATIONAL DEFENSES 14-31
(1990) (addressing how defensive reasoning affects organizations); see also ARGYRIS &
SCH6N, supra note 8, at 15-17 (discussing organizational learning). For an attempt to
integrate Argyris's theory with economic theory, see Harvey Leibenstein & Shlomo




The image that we are left with, then, is that the forward-looking
information package that arrives at the top of the hierarchy after be-
ing filtered through multiple layers-the mosaic of data and infer-
ence from which forward-looking corporate disclosures must be
drawn-is likely to be more uncertain in its accuracy than might ap-
pear at first glance. Positive information will move more quickly to
the top, with the primary problem in assessing it being the possibility
of overstatement, and excessive and conflicting claims of credit.
Negative information will travel more slowly, if at all, and will be more
subject to skewing. On average, a natural optimistic bias results. And
the problem of distortion becomes most severe in companies that
face substantial adverse shocks to their environments.7
We should therefore be sympathetic to the plight of the senior
executive charged with disclosure responsibilities. There is evidence
in the literature that senior executives do habitually discount the ve-
racity of information that moves upward, especially when it has a posi-
tive spin. 0 But that discount is rough and imprecise, and thus of little
aid in achieving disclosure accuracy. Forward-looking disclosure or
disclosure of facts, the import of which are largely predictive, must of-
ten be made with less-than-complete confidence of their accuracy,
with the nagging sense that with more time, doubts about data quality
might naturally diminish. From time to time, senior executives will
discover, much too late, that the truth is indeed quite different from
what they have been led to believe. To be sure, senior executives
cannot explicitly acknowledge this. Part of the essential dramaturgi-
cal role of senior managers is to comnunicate confidence and con-
trol over their environment, and as we have seen, many management
theorists believe that effective corporate disclosure must reflect a
comparable level of confidence in control, if not performance, by the
senior management group.81 Thus, even putting aside the possibility
that those top managers have their own selfish reasons to distort,
there is a substantial risk of a mismatch between what they say and
79 According to the organizational-decline literature, see supra note 50, one com-
mon tendency in firms under financial stress is the centralization of authority at the
top, thereby narrowing of lines of communication. See Sutton, supra note 50, at 223-26
(describing "rigidity" effects of danger). Sensing a last period, employees may then
abet this tendency by either withdrawing or engaging in extremely self-protective
communications.
80 SeeHaft, supra note 65, at 1053-54 ("Superiors may reduce distortion by counter-
biasing or discounting the content of the message by the self-interest that they per-
ceive the sender to have in the message."), and sources cited therein.
a' See supra notes 49-50 and accompanying text.
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what, once a retrospective look at what all those in the organization
actually knew or sensed is undertaken, was "known" by others in the
firm.
B. Some Legal Implications
There are some interesting implications for corporate and securi-
ties law simply from recognizing the dynamics of information flow.
The dominating question is whether a company can be held liable for
a violation of Rule 10b-5 upon a showing that even though the indi-
vidual managers who formulated the disclosure were not aware of in-
formation that would cause them to doubt its accuracy, such informa-
tion was possessed by others in the company (who may or may not have
known that disclosure was being made)."' Rule 10b-5 has a scienter
requirement, which in the eyes of most courts can be satisfied by a
showing of either knowledge or recklessness on the defendant's
part83
82 Arguably, it is something of an open question as to whether companies can be
held liable at all under Rule lOb-5 as primary violators (as opposed to controlling per-
sons under section 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78t(a) (1994)).
By most accounts, they can, if by nothing else than reference to the definition of
.person" in section 3(a) (9) of the Act, which refers specifically tojuristic persons. See
id. § 78c(a) (9) ("The term 'person' means a... company...."). Since corporations
almost by necessity speak through agents, the natural construction of section 10(b), id.
§ 78j (b), and section 3(a) (9), id. § 78c(a) (9), read together, makes it possible for cor-
porations and other business entities to violate the antifraud provision directly. See
SEC v. Management Dynamics, Inc., 515 F.2d 801, 812 (2d Cir. 1975) ("Congress evi-
dently intended that a corporation might be liable in some instances as a 'person'; and
this can only be by virtue of agency principles, since a corporation can act only
through its agents."). For this reason, we shall assume that corporations can be pri-
mary violators even though they speak through their agents, notwithstanding the sug-
gestion in Central Bank v. First Interstate Bank that section 10(b) does not prohibit sec-
ondary forms of liability. See 511 U.S. 164, 184 (1994) ("The fact that Congress chose
to impose some forms of secondary liability, but not others, indicates a deliberate con-
gressional choice with which the courts should not interfere."); Donald C. Langevoort,
Words from on High About Rule lob-5: Chiarella 's History, Central Bank s Future 20 DEL
J. CORP. L. 865, 893-96 (1995) (reformulating fraud cases formerly understood as is-
sues of respondeat superior liability into terms of direct-entity liability).
's See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 201 (1976) ("§ 10(b) was ad-
dressed to practices that involve some elements of scienter and cannot be read to im-
pose liability for negligent conduct alone."); COX ET AL., supra note 11, at 697-709
(commenting that Hochfelderonly rejected negligence from sufficing for liability under
Rule lOb-5 without further defining scienter). The prevailing approach today is to
treat recklessness as a subjective standard: There must be some awareness of the risk
that the disclosure is false or misleading, not simply an extreme departure from the
standard of care. See, e.g., Sanders v. John Nuveen & Co., 554 F.2d 790, 793 (7th Cir.
1977) ("We believe 'reckless' in these circumstances comes closer to being a lesser
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It is easy enough doctrinally to make the affirmative case, simply
by invoking basic agency-law principles that attribute all information
acquired by any company employee acting in the scope of her author-
ity to the company itself.84 Agency law contains a "corruption" excep-
tion for situations where the employee is acting in a purely self-
serving fashion, but this would not apply to the normal kinds of busi-
ness-related information we have been discussing."' Outside of the
securities laws, a number of criminal and civil cases have concluded
that one need not identify any individual manager who is culpable in
order to have firm culpability under a "knowledge" standard: Aggre-
86gation of knowledge is an acceptable basis for liability. No cases,
however, explicitly recognize such a theory under Rule 10>5, and
many cases, indirectly at least, seem to assume the contrary-that li-
ability follows only if the human beings responsible for the disclosure
were aware of the falsity or recklessly disregarded the truth."7
form of intent than merely a greater degree of ordinary negligence. We perceive it to
be notjust a difference in degree, but also in kind.").
84 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 272 (1958) (mandating general
attribution of knowledge). For one of the few academic discussions of this issue, see
Craig L. Griffin, Corporate Scienter Under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 1989 BYU L.
REV. 1227.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFAGENCY § 282 (1958) (providing that knowledge
of the agent is not attributed to the principal if the agent is acting adversely to the
principal when the agent obtains or uses the knowledge).
81 See, e.g., Nordstrom, Inc. v. Chubb & Son, Inc., 54 F.3d 1424, 1434 (9th Cir.
1995) (finding that a good-faith defense in a fraud case is only available where the di-
rectors did not induce the acts constituting the violation); Bank of New England v.
United States, 821 F.2d 844, 850 (1st Cir. 1987) ("A collective knowledge instruction is
entirely appropriate in the context of corporate criminal activity."); C.I.T. Corp. v.
United States, 150 F.2d 85, 94 (9th Cir. 1945) ("In order that concealment of the
property of a bankrupt may be... a crime, it must be 'knowingly and fraudulently'
concealed .... ."). This is not the case, however, if the standard is based on willfulness.
See SABA v. Compagnie Nationale Air France, 78 F.3d 664, 668 (D.C. Cir. 1996)
(finding that lack ofjudgment and common sense by employees does not constitute
willful misconduct). For a recent argument that this line of authority is both mis-
guided and based on a misreading of the seminal case law, see Thomas A. Hageman &
Joseph Grinstein, The Mythology of Aggregate Corporate Knowledge: A Deconstruction, 65
GEO. WASH. L. REv. 210 (1997).
87 See, e.g., First Equity Corp. v. Standard & Poor's Corp., 690 F. Supp. 256, 260
(S.D.N.Y. 1988) ("A corporation can be held to have a particular state of mind only
when that state of mind is possessed by a single individual."). Most cases that deal with
scienter do so on preliminary motions to dismiss for failure to plead facts giving rise to
a sufficient inference of scienter. Here, a court may well choose to allow the knowl-
edge of subordinates to suffice even if the court believes that a showing of knowledge
by the person responsible for the disclosure would be required at trial before liability
could be imposed. For a case allowing a complaint to stand on such grounds, al-
though hinting that a showing that the high-level officials were not actually aware of
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The possibility that information-flow distortion can produce inac-
curate disclosures by high-level officials helps illuminate this policy
issue. To the extent that either the compensatory goal of making in-
vestors-who somehow have relied on misinformation-whole, or the
deterrence goal of preventing misinformation from affecting the
market, is compelling, then a rule requiring that the speaker act with
scienter would be counterproductive: Even if the compensatory goal
in fraud-on-the-market cases is questionable,8s the, deterrence goal is
undeniably crucial to the ultimate goal of producing accurate stock
prices.89 One can also assume that were this rule well understood
within firms, the tendency to withhold deliberately damaging infor-
mation from superiors as a way of protecting both themselves and the
firm would be stronger.90 Superiors would have one more'reason to
prefer the "plausible deniability" that comes from avoiding full in-
formation.91 That is hardly a desirable outcome.
At the same time, of course, one should also be aware of the costs
associated with the aggregation rule, costs all ultimately borne by the
firm's shareholders. De facto, this means that senior executives can-
not prevent corporate liability simply by behaving honestly as a group,
but instead must implement the best available internal information-
control devices to manage the liability risk. However, such protection
will only be partial; breakdowns are inevitable in the best of systems.
In essence, then, Rule 10b-5 would operate for firms in something
more akin to a negligence standard in terms of the precaution costs it
generates. Some law-and-economics scholars have treated this scien-
ter-based liability as if it generates no such costs.92 That treatment is
the problem would preclude issuer liability at trial, see Steiner v. Unitrode Corp., 834 F.
Supp. 40, 45 (D. Mass. 1993).
8 See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
9 See Marcel Kahan, Securities Law and the Social Costs of Inaccurate Stock Prices, 41
Duke LJ. 977, 1028 (1992) (discussing the various ways in which stock-price inaccura-
cies detrimentally affect the market and management's behavior).
90 See Coffee, supra note 4, at 1119 (discussing the rationale of and the solutions' to
"defensive" corporate misbehavior).
91 See supra note 75 and accompanying text. In this regard, Jennifer Arlen has
noted that too easy an attributional form of corporate criminal liability can lead cor-
porations to underinvest in monitoring and detection mechanisms. SeeJennifer Arlen,
The Potentially Perverse Effects of Corporate Criminal Liability, 23J. LEGAL STUD. 833, 843
(1994) (discussing the effects that different schemes of imposing criminal corporate
liability will have on corporate enforcement expenditures). Of course, this would not
necessarily deter firms from monitoring in order to detect misconduct that was about
to occur or still in the process of occurring.
Cf., e.g., EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 1, at 339-44 (arguing that the scien-
ter requirement encourages more accurate enforcement, but also acknowledging that
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probably inaccurate, given the fuzziness of securities-law responsibili-
ties and the palpable risk of judicial error.9 An aggregation rule
makes all the more clear what has been expressed in Part I-that Rule
10b-5 generates a surprisingly large number of hidden costs that must
be added to the calculus when assessing desirable policy.
94
To the extent that the law continues its apparent preference for
requiring actor-level scienter, however, another message becomes
clear: Recklessness has a particularly important practical role to play
in the application of Rule lOb-5. Recall once again the likely sense
that senior executives have when dealing with fast-moving corporate
events for which they lack primary access to information. They will
receive information, perhaps from multiple, and thus conflicting,
sources that may well have become distorted in transmission. In
other words, senior executives have some basis for disclosure, but may
be less than fully confident of its accuracy. A public statement that
relies on this internal information but fails to convey the bases for
doubt or the conflicting information available to the speaker may not
be a knowing form of deception-in some ways, it is the speaker's
best estimate of the situation as presented from within the organiza-
tion.95 However, one can readily imagine particular cases in which
enough conscious doubt has been suppressed that the resulting dis-
closure is culpably misleading, and recklessness would provide thecleaestway ... 96
clearest way of characterizing the underlying state of mind.
The agency-cost information-distortion phenomenon may also
help explain some well-known judicial decisions in securities law. As
if section 10(b) does generate precaution costs, their own analysis would have to
change).
9' See Mahoney, supra note 57, at 625 ("[T]he problem of applying fraud doctrine
to impersonal markets extends beyond securities law, and taken to its extreme, [the
fraud-on-the-market theory] could swallow up a considerable amount of the common
law of fraud."). Because scienter can be proven circumstantially, it is always possible
that the corporate executive's disregard of red flags, considered in hindsight, will be
treated by the courts as recklessness, when, in reality, it might have been, at most, neg-
ligence.
94 See supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text.
.5 Here, on the assumption regarding actor intent-based liability, there would be
no cause for imposing liability. On the other hand, if the law were to choose a broad
attribution rule, this would not be an issue: The corporation would be liable simply
via the attribution of knowledge from other employees.
Consistent with the subjective test for recklessness, this is the situation in which
the executive is consciously unsure of the accuracy of his statements, but speaks confi-
dently nonetheless. For a recent survey of the law in this area, see William H.
Kuehnle, On Scienter, Knowledge, and Recklessness Under the Federal Securities Laws, 34
Hous. L. REV. 121 (1997).
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noted earlier, the seminal fraud-on-the-market decision under Rule
1Ob-5 is SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.97 There, Texas Gulf Sulphur
("TGS") was in possession of core drilling samples that suggested that
certain property in Ontario might contain extremely valuable mineral
deposits; yet a TGS press release dampened the investor enthusiasm
that had developed as rumors leaked out about the possible find. 8
Thus, this case is one of the less common "good news" concealment
cases under Rule 10b-5. One of the fascinating questions that re-
mains is why TGS would have taken the actions that it did. A com-
mon response is that the company was seeking to buy up more land
and wanted to keep potential sellers unaware of the value of their
property, but this seems questionable. The rumors were already cir-
culating, and the press release hardly denied the find.9 Few of the
owners of land coveted by TGS would be fooled into selling their land
at less than full value in this setting. There is an intriguing alternative
explanation: To the extent that top company officials had some rea-
son, based on past experience, to be skeptical of the internal optimis-
tic reports, a natural and good-faith response would be one that lay-
ered the disclosure with an abundance of caution in order to reduce
litigation exposure should the actual results turn out to be disap-
pointing. The TGS press release, in other words, might simply have
been the product of managers who, like many of their peers, have
doubts about the heralds of good news that commonly percolate up
from the operating divisions, and habitually apply a discount to these
100
messages.
III. BIASED INFERENCE AND CORPORATE CULTURES
A. The Sources of Bias
The organizational and social environment in which the decision maker
finds himself determines what consequences he will anticipate, what
ones he will not; what alternatives he will consider, what ones he will ig-
nore. In a theory of organization these variables cannot be treated as
unexplained independent factors, but must themselves be determined
and predicted by the theory.101
97 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968); see supra note 27 and accompanying text.
98 See Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d at 845.
'9 See id. at 844-46.
" See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
101 JAMES G. MARCH & HERBERT A. SIMON, ORGANIZATIONS 160 (2d ed. 1993); see
also Mark C. Suchman, Managing Legitimacy: Strategic and Institutional Approaches, 20
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As this quotation fromJames March and Herbert Simon's seminal
work on organizational behavior implies, there are crucial differences
in how organization theorists who do not work from the standard
economic paradigm view organizational cognition as compared to
more orthodox economists. In many ways, these differences boil
down to an emphasis on organizational culture that is distinct from
the immediate performance demands of the profit-seeking enter-
prise. Culture-the norms, routines, and shared understandings and
expectations of those who participate in the firm's activities°2--is cen-
tral because performance demands are often highly ambiguous once
basic success has been achieved and the set of routines supporting the
firm's basic technology is in place. In the face of external ambiguity
with respect to further strategic decisionmaking,1 organizations may
turn inward to find explanations for action and the pursuit of legiti-
macy.
Some of this inwardness has a perfectly rational agency-cost ex-
planation.' 4 Basic technological success creates vested political inter-
ests within the firm that are upset by strategic or technological
change. As in all aspects of society, process and routine are inher-
ently conservative. As March and Simon suggest, however, culture
also has a strong cognitive dimension that does not simply reflect the
self-interests of individual power bases. A basic premise in work on
organizational behavior is that institutions develop belief systems-
shared ways of interpreting themselves, their environments, their
pasts, and their prospects. These belief systems are functionally im-
portant because they facilitate interaction and communication be-
tween managers and employees, simplifying the task of coordinating
ACAD. MGMT. REV. 571, 573 (1995) (discussing the importance of social values in the
organizational structure).
102 From among the vast literature on corporate cultures, see JOANNE MARTIN,
CULTURES IN ORGANIZATIONS (1992).
103 According to one review of the available literature, the fundamental challenge
faced by managers, and hence their organizations, is "that their information worlds
are extremely complex, ambiguous, and munificent." Walsh, supra note 20, at 280; see
also FrancesJ. Milliken & Theresa K. Lant, The Effect of an Organization's Recent Perform-
ance History on Strategic Persistence and Change: The Role of Managerial Interpretation, in 7
ADVANCES IN STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT 129, 152 (Paul Shrivastava et al. eds., 1991)
(suggesting that "managers... may ignore environmental changes, may be motivated
to explain performance outcomes in ways that protect themselves, and may persist
with outdated strategies, or even undermine the organizational properties that have
produced success").
0 4 For an exploration of bureaucratic growth that incorporates both standard
economics and psychological explanations, see Saul Levmore, Irreversibility and the Law:
The Size of Firms and Other Organizations, 18J. CORP. L. 333 (1993).
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the diverse activities of large numbers of people. The failure of com-
pany employees to operate on a shared set of assumptions about their
environment makes internal negotiation difficult and coherent op-
erations impossible. 5 Equally important are useful belief systems
that are essential to the task of gaining support from employees and
other key constituents of the firm.'06 Indeed, many theorists argue
that the crucial job of top management is nurturing the optimal belief
system. Jeffrey Pfeffer, for example, writes that management is essen-
tially the art of providing "explanations, rationalizations, and legiti-
mation for the activities undertaken in the organization."07 Similarly,
Karl Weick and Richard Daft contend that "the job of management is
to interpret, not to get the work of the organization done."' This is
not to say that all employees become true believers in all that man-
agement says or that corporate norms suggest. Consciously, some
employees will often complain or criticize the corporate belief system.
But few doubt that, on average (and even with respect to some of the
apparent cynics), these belief systems are powerful normative influ-
ences once a coherent culture evolves.
We need not treat even this as a wholly noneconomic construct,
of course. Economists have increasingly become interested in cul-
tures as reputational mechanisms for generating trust within organi-
zations and making the firm's external commitments more credi-
105 SeeMARTHAS. FtLDMAN, ORDER WITHOUTDESIGN 136-37 (1989) (discussing the
ability of routines "to organize work and produce results despite the fact that the par-
ticipants... do not appear to value... the outcomes"). This is an extremely impor-
tant point. Imagine two people who must work out a commercial relationship. The
first task is to come to some common understanding of the existing situation, and
then move on to understand the means necessary to carry out their mutual objective.
That is often a difficult and time-consuming task. Add a third person, and so on, and
the task becomes exponentially more complex. In a large organization, there are
hundreds, perhaps thousands, of key stakeholders. If each transaction within the firm
must be preceded by this process of mutual orientation and agreement, the ability to
conduct intrafirm business will be slowed considerably. To the extent that a shared
culture provides stock understandings, these same transactions will be facilitated, and
with them, firm efficiency. For an example of the need to gain a common understand-
ing in order to produce coherent corporate activity, see C. Marlene Fool, Consensus,
Diversity, and Learning in Organizations, 5 ORG. Scl. 403 (1993).
106 See supra notes 49-50 and accompanying text
107 Pfeffer, supra note 49, at 4.
108 Karl E. Weick & Richard L. Daft, The Effectiveness of Interpretation Systems, in




ble.'9 The primary points of departure, however, are cognitive and
behavioral. Cultures can have strong elements of myth in them; they
do not depend on (and may find counterproductive) too strong a
dose of reality. Myths reduce the fear and stress that uncertainty of-
ten generates. Consequently, there are strong arguments within the
literature on organizational cognition that predictable biases operate
within corporate belief systems in a way that cause managers to misper-
ceive events and risks, allowing them in good faith to perpetuate an
unrealistic belief system in the face of external stress."0 If so, we have
another plausible explanation for deceptive corporate disclosure,
with interesting legal implications. Disclosure will reflect not what an
objective observer would see, but what someone embedded in the
corporate culture would perceive.
To be sure, there are no fixed behavioral rules that inevitably
blind corporate managers-the standard claim here is that there is a
loose coupling between beliefs and productivity, not a complete sepa-
ration."' Much information is sufficiently unambiguous that its mes-
"9 See David M. Kreps, Corporate Culture and Economic Theory, in PERSPECTIVES ON
POsITIvE POLITICAL ECONOMY 90, 100-11 (James E. Alt & Kenneth A. ShepsIe eds.,
1990) (discussing reputational theory in corporate transactions).
"10 See sources cited supra note 20 (discussing organization-based perceptual bi-
ases); see also Marjorie A. Lyles & Charles R. Schwenk, Top Management, Strategy and Or-
ganizational Knowledge Structures, 29 J. MGMT. STUD. 155, 170 (1992) (arguing that
"organizational knowledge structures assume that there is a representation of complex
events and their interpretations are stored in the collective knowledge of firms" and
noting that "[s]trategic responses to new situations may be the result of generalizing
from the existing knowledge structure"); William H. Starbuck, Congealing Oil Invent-
ing Ideologies to Justfy Acting Ideologies Out, 19J. MGMT. STUD. 3, 8 (1982) (describing
studies that show managerial beliefs that depart substantially from objective measures
of reality, sometimes falling into the category of the "utterly fantastic"); Starbuck &
Milliken, supra note 20, at 36 (arguing that different perceptual filtering processes af-
fect how executives "observe and try to understand their environments"). For specific
examples, see Paul Shrivastava et al., Nonrationality in Organizational Actions, 17 INT'L
STUD. MGMT. & ORG. 90, 91-95 (1987) (discussing how corporate belief systems con-
tributed to disasters for Texas Instruments, Citibank, and International Harvester),
and Shaler A. Zahra & Sherry S. Chaples, Blind Spots in Competitive Analysis, ACAD.
MGMT. EXEcUTIVE, May 1993, at 7, 9-21 (identifying six flaws in companies' analyses of
their competitive market).
. See Daniel A. Levinthal &James G. March, The Myopia of Learning, 14 STRATEGIC
MGT. J., Special Issue, Winter 1993, at 95, 110 (1993) (noting pervasive learning bi-
ases, but also conceding that organizations can improve). Not surprisingly, psycho-
logically oriented researchers and conventional economists debate over the ability of
"cognitive defects" to persist, especially in competitive markets and among expert de-
cisionmakers. See infra notes 165-95. There are, however, two reasons why considera-
tion of biases can fit reasonably well into the economist's framework, at least within
the "bounded rationality" paradigm that has come to be widely accepted. See Conlisk,
supra note 3, at 669 (providing four reasons to incorporate bounded rationality in
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sage is hard to distort. Even in the face of ambiguity, some managers,
under some circumstances, will see risks more clearly, and some
companies will do better than others at "debiasing." Bias is highly
contextual, and I do not want to overstate the incidence of distortion
in corporate perception. My claim is simply this: These biases are
sufficiently well-accepted in both the theoretical and empirical litera-
ture that we should take them seriously as behavioral risks, even if we
cannot determine their exact role in any given setting' or estimate
how often they will apply in general. Four such biases, discussed be-
low, are worth particular attention. 11
economic models). One is the counterintuitive but persuasive conclusion that many
of these biases may be adaptive and efficient on average-something that helps ex-
plain their persistence even among experts. See Colin F. Camerer & Eric J. Johnson,
The Process-Performance Paradox in Expert Judgment: How Can Experts Know So Much and
Predict So Badly?, in TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF EXPERTISE 195, 210 (K. Anders Er-
icsson &Jacqui Smith eds., 1991) (noting that experts, in the face of contradictory
evidence, tend to revise rather than abandon their configurational rules). The other
is ample evidence that people and organizations do not learn from experience as well
as the rational-actor model would predict. For people to learn from their mistakes,
feedback must be both immediate and unambiguous-conditions that rarely apply in
business settings. Hence, biases and illusions can persist. See, e.g., Ed Bukszar & Terry
Connolly, Hindsight Bias and Strategic Choice: Some Problems in Learning from Experienc
31 ACAD. MGMT.J. 628, 630 (1988) (suggesting that hindsight distorts a manager's un-
derstanding of past decisions); Jack Feldman, On the Difficulty of Learning from Experi-
ence, in THE THINKING ORGANIZATION, supra note 20, at 263, 271-79 (outlining factors
that produce errors in learning from experience).
12 There is a strong and justified concern that psychological explanations can be
invoked too easily to explain "fiascos" in hindsight. The factual complexity of such
settings makes empirical verification impossible. See, e.g., MARK BOVENS & PAUL 'T
HART, UNDERSTANDING POtICYFASCOS 8-9 (1996) ("People tend to underestimate sys-
tematically the complexity of issues, the inconclusiveness of information and the gen-
eral uncertainty which is caused by strategic interaction ... ."); Baruch Fischhoff &
Ruth Beyth-Marom, Failure Has Many Fathers, 7 POL'Y Sci. 388, 391 (1978) (reviewing
IRVING JANIS, VICTIMS OF GRoUPTHINK (1972)) (" [P]eople consistently overestimate
the predictability of past events once they know how they turned out.").
" The social-cognition literature tends to distinguish between two types of biases.
Some are purely cognitive ("cold"). They exist simply to manage complexity and
make action possible in a world of bounded rationality. See Philip E. Tetlock & Ariel
Levi, Attribution Bias: On the Inconclusiveness of the Cognition-Motivation Debate, 18J. Ex-
PERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 68, 70-74 (1982) (discussing the cognitive approach).
Others are motivated ("hot"). These biases exist because they serve some adaptive
function not grounded in rationality, and thus are the more likely source of mythic
beliefs. See id. at 75-82 (discussing the motivational theories). In many cases, it is diffi-
cult to arrive at a single explanation. See id. at 84. ("[T]he dichotomy between cogni-
tive and motivational explanations will become increasingly blurred and difficult to
discern as the two theoretical positions are refined.").
[Vol. 146: 101
ORGANIZED ILLUSIONS
1. Cognitive Conservatism and Decision Simplification
A well-documented tendency of people who must operate in noisy
informational environments is to adopt heuristic forms of thought.
Busy executives process extraordinarily large amounts of information
in both making decisions and deciding what matters deserve further
time and attention. Such processing must necessarily be simplified,
sometimes oversimplified, to make the information manageable, lest
the executive be overwhelmed by data and paralyzed by ambiguity.
4
Commonly, people build schemas to provide them with "best
available" interpretations. These include stock understandings of
people and situations. When given enough motivation, people will
revise their schemas to reflect new information. But processing limits
lead to a bias against revision: The normal cognitive strategy is to
construe information and events in such a way as to confirm prior at-
titudes, beliefs, and impressions. Like all biases, this "cognitive con-
servatism" occurs unconsciously."'
"' See Sara Kiesler & Lee Sproull, Managerial Responses to Changing Environments:
Perspectives on Problem Sensing from Social Cognition, 27 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 548, 549 (1982)
(noting that large amounts of information often obscure the meaning of relevant in-
formation); Walsh, supra note 20, at 280-81 (discussing the "bewildering flow of infor-
mation faced by managers"). One of the remarkable developments in economics dur-
ing the last decade or so has been the growing recognition of the costs associated with
cognitive attention, and, accordingly, the need to develop models of decisionmaking
that recognize the tradeoffs that must be made. See, e.g., JOHN W. PAYNE ET AL, THE
ADAPrIvE DECISION MAKER 70-116, 114 (1993) ("[S]trategy selection is the result of a
compromise between the desire to make the most accurate decision and the desire to
minimize effort."). For a review of the recent literature, see Conlisk, supra note 3, at
670-75.
"S See SUSAN T. FISKE & SHELLEY E. TAYLOR, SOCIAL COGNITION 149-51, 150 (2d ed.
1991) ("Well-developed schemas generally resist change and can even persist in the
face of disconfirming evidence."); RICHARD NISBETT & LEE Ross, HUiAN INFERENCE
167 (1981) ("Few critiques of human judgmental failings ring as true as Ba-
con's... attack on people's tendency to adhere to a preconceived belief .... ."); Char-
les G. Lord et al., Biased Assimilation and Attitude Polarization: The Effects of Prior Theories
on Subsequently Considered Evidence, 37 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL 2098, 2099
(1979) ("[Ilndividuals will dismiss and discount empirical evidence that contradicts
their initial views but will derive support from evidence, of no greater probativeness,
that seems consistent with their views.").
"1 Janis and Mann, like other psychologists, use the term "preconscious" to de-
scribe this form of bias that operates just outside of consciousness, and explore its im-
plications for group decisionmaking. See IRVING L. JANIS & LEON MANN, DECISION
MAKING 95-96 (1977) (describing "preconscious" emotional impulses as those of which
a person may become aware if someone induces her to scrutinize her thoughts).
Managerial self-deception is a partial but important theme underlying the demise of
some American corporations in Harry Levinson, Why the Behemoths Fell: Psychological
Roots of Corporate Failur4 49 AM. PSYCHOL 428 (1994).
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From this, we can see how even a single manager, acting alone,
would tend unconsciously to resist the significance of information
calling into question the viability of a course of action-something
particularly troubling given the tendency in many companies, noted
in Part II, to have as a norm that information is to be passed upward
to supervisory managers only if it is both significant and unusual.1
7
Successful companies naturally produce positive schemas: previous
challenges overcome, financing obtained, and products successfully
brought to market. A new product is begun in an environment where
the decisionmakers agree that there is a sound basis for its develop-
ment. That becomes the schema (or "script"), and potentially trou-
bling bits of information are subject to dismissal or rationalization,
without much conscious deliberation, if they can be processed consis-
tently with the original belief." " The tendency to ignore evidence of
change in one's environment is likely to be especially strong when, as
they usually do, the bits of information come sequentially in small
doses rather than aggregated in some salient event.
While we can explain cognitive conservatism simply in terms of
bounded rationality, it also has the motivational role of reducing
stress. Revising a schema is anxiety-provoking, especially if it opens
up a host of troubling possibilities. Subconsciously, busy executives
do not want to be bothered with disconfirming information, and so
will seek to minimize the threat. Like most everyone (except the
neurotic, who do not thrive in business settings), they will tend to ig-
nore risks that appear to have little probability of occurring." 9 Again,
117 See supra notes 60-63 and accompanying text.
118 A fascinating account of the influence of script-based cognitive conservatism on
Ford's Pinto experience-written by a psychologist who, prior to becoming an aca-
demic, was one of Ford's recall managers-is given in Dennis A. Gioia, Pinto Fires and
Personal Ethics: A Script Analysis of Missed Opportunities, 11 J. Bus. ETHIcs 379 (1992).
Another illuminating discussion, concentrating on Boise Cascade's ill-fated expansion
in the area of retail building supplies, is Erhard K. Valentin, Anatomy of a Fatal Business
Strategy, 31J. MGMT. STUD. 359 (1994).
119 This is a well-known phenomenon. See, e.g., Colin Camerer & Howard Kun-
reuther, Decision Processes for Low Probability Risks: Policy Implications, 8J. POL'YANALySIS
& MGMT. 565, 570 (1987) (examining how people make judgments about low-
probability, high-consequence risks). An interesting study of how organizations plan
for low-probability events that they choose to consider-and the unrealistic way they
often do so-is Lee Clarke & Charles Perrow, Prosaic Organizational Failur4 39 AM.
BEHAV. SC. 1040 (1996). Legal rules may also account for people's failure to consider
risks that appear to have little probability of occurring. See Eisenberg, supra note 3, at
232-35 (arguing that liquidated-damage provisions in contracts may be adjusted when
damages are unexpectedly high); Clayton P. Gillette, Commercial Relationships and the
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the preferred course is dismissal or explanation in conformity with
the existing schema; it takes a fairly vivid or salient threat to prompt
revision.' In general, then, we can predict that most managers will
systematically underestimate external threats to success.
These tendencies are strengthened when managers work in teams
or share decisionmaking responsibility. Because of the demands of
communication and negotiation, groups can attend to even less in-
formation than individuals, leading to a tendency to simplify agendas
in order to make decisions tractable. This is frequently done by fo-
cusing the group's attention only on immediate, first-level effects,
putting out of mind the more complicated and unpredictable-
though potentially important-second-level and systematic conse-
quences. Ambiguous information tends to be dismissed as unman-
ageable:2 There is an excessively high test of materiality. In an in-
triguing article on ethical decisionmaking, David Messick and Max
Bazerman note both the tendency of many managers to be intolerant
of uncertain data-for example, the "tough-minded executive," who,
in evaluating potential hiring discrimination, will accept only specific
instances of demonstrable bias, not statistics and probabilities-as
well as a tendency toward circumscribed information searches in
reaching decisions, thereby forcing an underestimation of the impact
Selection of Default Rules for Remote Risks, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 535, 562-74 (1990)
(examining risk attitudes in commercial activities).
'2' SeeNISBETr & Ross, supra note 115, at 167-92 (discussing belief perseverance in
the face of disconfirming evidence and the infrequent situations in which beliefs do
change).
121 On the organizational need to simplify, see Danny Miller, The Architecture of Sim-
plicity, 18 ACAD. MGmT. REV. 116 (1993).
' See Craig D. Parks & Rebecca A. Cowlin, Acceptance of Uncommon Information into
Group Decisions When That Information Is or Is Not Demonstrable, 66 ORG. BEHAV. & HUM.
DECISION PROCESSES 307, 307 (1996) ("Facts that are known by only one member are
treated with skepticism by others and do not factor terribly into the group's deci-
sion."); see also Peter H. Kim, When What You Know Can Hurt You: A Study of Experiential
Effects on Group Discussion and Performanc 69 ORG. BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION
PROCESSES 165, 165-66 (1997) (discussing the bias of group members toward discuss-
ing common information). This is not to say that under some particular circum-
stances, group-decision processes cannot improve decisionmaking. See, e.g., Norbert L.
Kerr et al., Bias in Judgment: Comparing Individuals and Groups, 103 PSYCHOL. REv. 687,
713 (1996) (concluding that there is no answer to the question whether groups or in-
dividuals are more biased, and noting that group size, individualjudgment, magnitude
and type of bias, and the group-judgment process will influence a group's susceptibil-
ity to judgment bias). Groups, for instance, are good at filtering out nonsystematic
kinds of errors to which a particular member might be inclined. The point is simply
that group dynamics can intensify the influence of motivations that are shared among
group members.
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on secondary stakeholders and a failure to appreciate the risk that
strategic forms of "cheating" will be detected. Here, we see how
risks that might meet the lawyer's test for materiality in a disclosure
environment would be given less weight, and less attention, in the
primary business setting.
Groups are also motivated to preserve cohesiveness (and the effi-
cacy of their decisionmaking norms and procedures), and this too
can sometimes result in the underestimation of risk. When a member
brings up some information that suggests that the group's decision-
making has failed to consider something troubling, a threatening
form of stress is introduced into the environment. Without realizing
it, each member is inclined to dismiss or ignore danger signals, lead-
ing to less informed decisionmaking that more closely resembles col-
lective rationalization than prudent choice. 24 Moreover, even if a
group member privately wonders whether some bit of information is
troubling, the very fact that other group members do not appear to
be concerned is a reason to let the matter drop, a process of social
learning that has a dangerous circularity to it.'2 This is especially
powerful when there is a diffusion of responsibility among group
members such that none feels compelled to lead and each can justify
silence. 6 The term given to the group-cohesion phenomenon by
Irving Janis is "groupthink," and it is commonly used as an explana-
tion for myopic corporate and political behavior. A group of senior
'2 David H. Messick & Max H. Bazerman, Ethical Leadership and the Psychology of De-
cision Making, SLOAN MGMT. REv., Winter 1996, at 9, 10L11; see also Charles i Schwenk,
Cognitive Simplification in Strategic Decision-Making, 5 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 111, 112-22
(1984) (identifying and discussing cognitive simplification processes which affect deci-
sionmaking process).
121 SeeJANIS & MANN, supra note 116, at 129 ("When [the concurrence-seeking]
tendency is dominant, the members use their collective cognitive resources to develop
rationalizations supporting shared illusions about the invulnerabilitiy of their organi-
zation or nation and display other symptoms of 'group-think'-a collective pattern of
defensive avoidance." (citation omitted)).
2 See, e.g., ROBERT P. GANDOSsY, BAD BUSINESS 224-28 (1985) (describing the
process by which various accountants and investment bankers ignored signs that a
company was engaged in fraud, each pointing to the fact that since the others did not
act concerned, neither should they).
2 SeeJEFFREY PFEFFER, MANAGING WITH POWER 207-13 (1992) (examining the in-
fluence of informal social interaction and social consensus on the decisionmaking
process). The effects of diffusion are explored in Albert Bandura, Social Cognitive The-
oy of Moral Thought and Action, in 1 HANDBOOK OF MORAL BEHAvIOR AND DEVEL-
OPMENT 45, 84-86 (William M. Kurtines &Jacob L. Gewirtz eds., 1991).
127 SeeJANIS, supra note 112, at 8 (defining and analyzing the effect of groupthink
on political decisions). The stress-oriented explanation for group biases is elaborated
byJanis in his book with Leon Mann. SeeJANIS & MANN, supra note 116, at 129-30
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managers that unconsciously deflects threatening information to pre-
serve internal solidarity might well then disseminate inaccurate cor-
porate publicity.
2. Overoptimism and the Illusion of Control
We now move more squarely into the motivational sphere. One
of the most robust findings in the literature on individual decision-
making is that of the systematic tendency of many people to overrate
their own abilities, contributions, and talents. This egocentric bias
readily takes the form of excessive optimism and overconfidence,
coupled with an inflated sense of ability to control events and risks.
128
In explaining good and bad fortune, people are asymmetric: Positive
events are the product of their skill, negative ones of external circum-
stances. Furthermore, people filter self-referential information with
the same asymmetry to bolster or maintain self-esteem.'9 As with the
biases discussed in the previous subsection, these are largely uncon-
scious ones's° While some outward expressions of optimism and con-
fidence are deliberate forms of impression management, psycholo-
gists believe that most often the person truly accepts the excessively
positive self-schema. Self-deception is necessary to sustain the illusion
effectively, diminishing the anxiety produced by too much self-
doubt.1
3
(describing "groupthink" as a "collective pattern of avoidance"). Tests of groupthink
offer considerable support for the phenomenon as a potential behavioral explanation;
however, one must be cautious not to universalize it. See Philip E. Tetlock et al., Assess-
ing Political Group Dynamics: A Test of the Groupthink Mode4 63J. PERSONALrIY & Soc.
PSYCHOL. 403, 403 (1992) (explaining the validity of the groupthink model).
' See MAX H. BAZERMAN, JUDGMENT IN MANAGERIAL DECISION MAKING 37-39 (3d
ed. 1994) (discussing overconfidence among managers). For instance, a sample of
people who indicated near total certainty (1000-to-i odds) that theirjudgments were
right were in fact right only about 81% to 88% of the time. See id. at 38.
'2 See, e.g., David Dunning et al., A New Look at Motivated Inference: Are Self-Serving
Theories of Success a Product of Motivated Inference?, 69J. PERSONALrrY & Soc. PSYCHOL.
58, 58-59 (1995) (suggesting that people create models of excellence "in their own
image," in part, to bolster self-esteem); Anthony G. Greenwald, The Totalitarian Ego:
Fabrication and Revision of Personal History, 35 AM. PSYCHOL. 603, 608 (1980) (discussing
"a form of belief in personal infallibility").
See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
SeeJeff Greenberg et al., Why Do People Need Self-Esteem?: Converging Evidence That
Self-Esteem Serves an Anxiety Buffering Function, 63J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL 913,
913-21 (1992) (illustrating that self-esteem serves an anxiety-buffering function).
There are, of course, natural limits to the extent to which these distortions are possi-
ble. See Roy F. Baumeister, The Optimal Margin of /ilusion, 8 J. SOC. & CUINICAL
PSYCHOL 176, 176 (1989) (noting that "normal, healthy, well-adjusted people system-
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Evidence suggests that groups can increase optimistic biases,
3 2
and, in fact, overconfidence in business organizations is predictable
and frequently observed in field studies of particular firms. Optimists
are prized in the hiring process. For example, one of the leading re-
search psychologists in this area, Martin Seligman of the University of
Pennsylvania, has designed hiring tests to assess high levels of opti-
mism for numerous corporations, including Metropolitan Life's sales
force. 33 And, as noted in Part II, there is good reason to believe that
the tournament-like competition for promotion up the executive lad-
der overweights optimism and its associated behavioral traits, inflating
such behavior toward the top of the hierarchy.'3 This is especially so
in industries, like many service ones, where a sales and marketing cul-
ture dominates.
For obvious reasons, the prevalence of illusory control in many
businesses can become systematic, infecting the company's overarch-
ing belief system. Numerous studies offer evidence of it. Edward
Zajac and Max Bazerman, for example, contend that these cognitive
biases are the primary explanation for a host of suboptimal strategic
decisions of the type chronically observed in industry: overbidding
for assets, plant overexpansion, and foolish entry into new lines of
business . 3  As much as anything, they say, systematic overcommit-
ment derives from the inculcated and persistent belief-one that
136tends not to be eroded by learning and experience -that one's own
company is superior to its competitors, leading to an underestimation
of the competitors' likely responses to a strategic move. This expla-
atically distort their views of self and world, ... deriv[ing] important benefits from do-
ing so" and suggesting that "there is an optimal margin of illusion at which people are
happiest, function best, and so forth").
' See Chip Heath & ForestJ. Jourden, l!usions, Disillusions and the Buffering Effects
of Groups, 69 ORG. BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 103, 104-06 (1997) (indicating
that working in groups buffers participants from negative feelings that individuals of-
ten have after completing a project); Robert H. Mnookin & Lee Ross, Introduction to
BARRIERS TO CONFLICT RESOLUTION 3, 18 (Kenneth J. Arrow et al. eds., 1995)
(discussing "optimistic overconfidence" as one example of people's tendency to place
unwarranted confidence in their predictions about future events).
"3 See MARTIN E.P. SELIGMAN, LEARNED OPTIMISM 100-12 (1991).
"s See supra notes 66-69 and accompanying text.
See generally EdwardJ. Zajac & Max H. Bazerman, Blind Spots in Industry and Com-
petitor Analysis: Implications of Intedfirm (Mis)perceptions for Strategic Decisions, 16 ACAD.
MGMT. REv. 37 (1991).
'm See supra note 111 (discussing the persistence of biases and people's failure to
learn from experience).
157 See Zajac & Bazerman, supra note 135, at 40 ("[C]ompetitors tend to insuffi-
ciently consider the contingent decisions of their competitive others .... ").
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nation also underlies much of the work on the so-called "winner's
curse": the tendency for the winner of any auction to find later that
he has overpaid."" As a number of scholars have noted in explaining
why tender offers so often turn out to be unprofitable to the acquirer,
there is significant hubris in believing that the person who has placed
the highest value on an asset is likely to have made the most accurate
valuation.5 9
If overoptimism and the illusion of control come to affect a com-
pany's belief system, then the tendency to underestimate or rational-
ize risk in preparing publicity and disclosure will surely be exacer-
bated. Faced with some evidence that a product under development
is failing and market share is eroding, managers in many companies
will honestly believe that these are minor challenges that can readily
be overcome. They will draw on inflated schemas of past successes
and underrate their competitors' ability to capitalize.
1 4
Furthermore, a "can-do" culture built on these adaptive biases will
prize the dismissal of risk and reject any effort to accept and acknowl-
edge their seriousness publicly. As we saw previously, belief systems
are powerful and need nurturing.141 Moreover, disconfirming infor-
mation is stress-inducing, and the need to protect the management
group's cohesion will result in the dismissal or rationalization of prob-
lems if there is a plausible basis for so doing. Such belief systems may
not easily tolerate forms of publicity or disclosure that are at odds
with the corporate self-image.
"" See BAZERMAN, supra note 128, at 166-69 (discussing the "winner's curse" in
competitive bidding).
' See Bernard S. Black, Bidder Overpayment in Takeovers, 41 STAN. L. REV. 597, 624-
26 (1989) (discussing overpayment as the result of managers' overoptimism and igno-
rance); Richard Roll, The Hubris Hypothesis of Corporate Takeovers, 59 J. Bus. 197, 197
(1986) (arguing that bidding firms infected by hubris pay too much for their targets).
For an excellent survey of this phenorhenon from a behavioral perspective, see
Matthew L.A. Hayward & Donald C. Hambrick, Explaining the Premiums Paid for Large
Acquisitions: Evidence of CEO Hubris, 42 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 103 (1997). The finance litera-
ture increasingly points to the risk of hubris and overconfidence as well. See, e.g.,
David Hirshleifer et al., Security Analysis and Trading Patterns When Some Investors Receive
Information Before Others, 49J. FIN. 1665, 1686 (1994) (arguing that "because some in-
vestors receive information earlier than others, overconfidence will promote herd-
ing"); Raghuram Rajan & Henri Servaes, Analyst Following of Initial Public Offerings, 52J.
FIN. 507, 517 (1997) (examining the effects of analyst optimism on the performance
of initial public offerings).
' See Zajac & Bazerman, supra note 135, at 40 (noting "the failure of the competi-
tive actor to sufficiently consider the contingent decisions of the opponent").
i' See supra notes 106-08 and accompanying text.
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3. Commitment
Commitment is one of the foundational concepts of both indi-
vidual and organizational psychology. 42  Once a person voluntarily
commits to an idea or course of action, there is a strong motivation to
resist evidence that it was ill-chosen. Self-confidence and external
image are threatened both by introducing a troubling awareness of
the possibility of mistake and by raising the need to consider a rever-
sal of one's position, which, in turn, calls into question one's reputa-
tion for consistency, a highly valued asset in our economic culture. 43
Cognitive-dissonance theory predicts that once a commitment is
made, attitudes and beliefs will shift to preserve consistency.'" Sales
people and negotiators know well that once a person takes a few steps
toward some purchase or deal, the likelihood of agreement in-
145creases.
The management literature strongly suggests that once executives
have committed to a course of action, their subsequent survey of in-
formation is strongly biased to bolster their choice-especially when
their choice is public, and they can be held accountable for their de-
142 See D. Ramona Bobocel & John P. Meyer, Escalating Commitment to a Failing
Course of Action: Separating the Roles of Choice and Justification, 79 J. APPLIED SOC.
PSYCHOL. 360, 363 (1994) (presenting research findings that private and public justifi-
cations influence a decisionmaker's escalating commitment); Barry M. Staw, The Esca-
lation of Commitment to a Course of Action, 6 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 577, 584 (1981)
(discussing research on the escalation of commitment); Glen Whyte et al., Wen Suc-
cess Breeds Failure: The Role of Self-Efficacy in Escalating Commitment to a Losing Course of
Action, 18J. ORG. BEHAV. 415, 416-18 (1997) (tying commitment to self-efficacy and
overconfidence). Of course, one cannot be sure that commitment is necessarily a
bias; a rational actor might remain committed to a course of action if she fears that
discovery of the mistake will lead to termination. See Chandra Kanodia et al., Escalation
Errors and the Sunk Cost Effect: An Explanation Based on Reputation and Information Asym-
metries, 27 J. ACCT. REs. 59, 60 (1989) (suggesting that managers may escalate their
commitment to protect their reputations).
143 See Staw, supra note 142, at 580-81 (emphasizing the virtue of appearing consis-
tent).
144 See ELLIOT ARONSON, THE SOCIAL ANIMAL 178-79 (7th ed. 1995) (noting that
cognitive dissonance, namely, "a state of tension that occurs whenever an individual
simultaneously holds two cognitions (ideas, attitudes, beliefs, opinions) that are psy-
chologically inconsistent," is reduced "[bly changing one or both cognitions in such a
way as to render them more compatible (more consonant) with each other, or by add-
ing more cognitions that help bridge the gap between the original cognitions").
14 See ROBERT B. CIALDINI, INFLUENCE 18, 15 (3d ed. 1993) (noting the common
sales technique of selling an expensive item to a customer first to induce the customer
to buy other less expensive items as well, and the common practice of car dealers of




cisions.1 4 Bolstering evidence is actively sought, while disconfirming
information is subconsciously resisted. Although we can see a possi-
ble rational basis here grounded in the last-period problem, the
weight of authority supports the position that managers come to be-
lieve in the efficacy of projects for which they are responsible, objec-
tive evidence often notwithstanding. Hence, the phenomenon of
"throwing good money after bad." Various scholars have identified
the commitment bias as a primary cause of the chronic overcapacity
often observed in industry.
47
4. Self-Serving Beliefs
Both the optimistic and commitment biases raise a troubling con-
cern. Beliefs that lead to throwing good money after bad in an effort
to avoid acknowledging a mistake to one's self or to the public seem
to be fairly selfish forms of inference. This presents the possibility
that certain forms of managerial beliefs may not necessarily be
molded in the company's best interests-though that may be the
141 Postdecisional bolstering takes place in settings of accountability, even though
accountability otherwise tends to improve decision quality. See, e.g., Philip E. Tetlock
et al., Social and Cognitive Strategies for Coping with Accountability: Conformity, Complexity
and Bolstering, 57J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 632, 638 (1989) (noting that sub-
jects who committed themselves to positions engaged in less self-criticism and were
more concerned with selfjustification). I have suggested that this commitment bias
may prevent lawyers from fully appreciating the risk of client wrongdoing, making
them less than fully competent gatekeepers. See Donald C. Langevoort, Where Were the
Lauyers?: A Behavioral Inquiry into Lauyer Responsibility for Clients' Fraud, 46 VAND. L.
REV. 75, 111 (1993) ("[T]here are reasons.., to doubt that lawyers will be very good
gatekeepers once they have committed to representation and built a positive schema
regarding the client and the situation.").
147 See Zajac & Bazerman, supra note 135, at 45, 47 (noting that firms may irration-
ally escalate commitment to expand capacity). On overcapacity generally, see
MICHAEL E. PORTER, COMPETITIVE STRATEGY 328 (1980). An interesting account of
the escalation of commitment to a course of action as applied to an example of mana-
gerial wrongdoing-the dilution of apple juice by Beech-Nut executives-can be
found in PHILIP G. ZIMBARDO & MICHAEL R. LIEPPE, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF ATTITUDE
CHANGE AND SOCIAL INFLUENCE 120-21 (1991). For another example, dealing with
Long Island Lighting Company's decision to build the Shoreham Nuclear Power
Plant, see Jerry Ross & Barry M. Staw, Organizational Escalation and Exit: Lessons from the
ShorehamNuclearPowerPlant, 36 ACAD. MGMT.J. 701 (1993).
148 Not so, of course, if this commitment bias simply reflects cognitive conservatism
and inflated self-efficacy, especially if derived from the organization's own biases. The
point here is that disentangling self-serving and business-oriented biases may not be so
easy. See Andrew D. Brown, Narcissism, Identity and Legitimacy, 22 ACAD. MGMTF. REV.
643, 648 (1997) (noting both the functional and dysfunctional elements of organiza-
tional egocentrism).
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outward impression-but rather they reflect the self-serving biases of
its senior managers.
The notion of self-serving inference is another fundamental con-
struct in social cognition.49 When there is enough ambiguity to per-
mit it, people naturally "see what they want to see."'50 And what they
want to see is something that is in their self-interest, not a threat to
either their self-esteem or career prospects. That threat is stressful,
and, to a small group, upsets cohesion.15 1 It is, therefore, resisted.
This is not to say that management control groups live in settings of
blissful ignorance. Much information is too unambiguous to deflect:
Corporations do have regular feedback in the form of sales data, cash
flow, and the like. Self-serving inference is an anxiety buffer, not an
anxiety eliminator. Management groups may subconsciously perceive
information in a way, if at all possible, that permits them to maintain
consistency with their self-image of efficacy and control, thereby justi-
fying (to themselves and others) preservation of their positions and
status. They will be adept at the self-deception that leads them to per-
suasively articulate the corporate interest in full consistency with their
personal goals.
49 See, e.g., Dennis A. Gioia, Self-Serving Bias as a Seif-Sensemaking Strategy: Explicit vs.
Tacit Impression Management, in IMPRESSION MANAGEMENT IN THE ORGANIZATION 219,
230-33 (Robert A. Giacalone & Paul Rosenfeld eds., 1989) (concluding that the objec-
tive of dealing with self-serving bias should be to manage it, not squelch it); George
Loewenstein, Behavioral Decision Theory and Business Ethics: Skewed Trade-offs Between Self
and Other, in CODES OF CONDUCT 214, 221 (David M. Messick & Ann E. Tenbreusel
eds., 1996) (noting that "[o]ne of the most important nonobjective influences on in-
formation processing is self-interest"). The most common manifestation is the ten-
dency to construe what is right or fair in a self-serving direction. See George Loewen-
stein et al., Self-Serving Assessments of Fairness and Pretrial Bargaining, 22J. LEGAL STUD.
135, 139 (1993) ("[Plredictions of the value of the claim and judgments of what set-
tlement would be fair are both biased in a self-serving manner. Moreover, the magni-
tude of the bias is a strong predictor of nonsettlement.").
,50 See THOMAS GILOVICH, How WE KNOW WHAT ISN'T So 75-87, 76 (1991)
(discussing the "tendency for people to believe.., what they want to believe"). This is
a classic form of motivated reasoning. See, e.g., Peter H. Ditto & David F. Lopez, Moti-
vated Skepticism: Use of Differential Decision Criteria for Preferred and Nonpreferred Conclu-
sions, 63J. PERSONALriY& Soc. PSYCHOL. 568, 568 (1992) (examining "the notion that
people are less skeptical consumers of desirable than undesirable information");
J. Edward Russo et al., The Distortion of Information During Decisions, 66 ORG. BEHAV. &
HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 102, 102 (1996) ("People seek information that confirms
their choice and depreciate encountered information that opposes it.").
1 We can thus include "in-group" biases within this framework. For a seminal ef-
fort to integrate in-group bias theory and corporate-law principles, see James D. Cox &
Harry L. Munsinger, Bias in the Boardroom: Psychological Foundations and Legal Implica-
tions of Coporate Cohesion, 48 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 83 (1985).
[Vol. 146: 101
ORGANIZED ILLUSIONS
Thus, we can see an optimistic culture as two-headed. On the one
hand, it may be very useful to the firm as a motivator. On the other
hand, optimism has a dark side, justifying the preservation of the
status quo, and hence can also serve as an entrenchment mecha-
nism."'2 If the future is rosy, senior managers deserve not only to
keep their jobs, but also to receive additional perquisites. This sug-
gests that highly optimistic forms of belief may well strengthen in the
face of increasingly disconfirming information as fed by the strong
personal needs of the senior managers. In all likelihood, one way
that we can measure the self-serving tendencies of top management is
to examine how well they diffuse within the firm. Natural optimism
should find a willing audience; more strained versions will be greeted
with increasing levels of skepticism among mid-level managers-who
are just as likely to engage in self-serving construal, although with dif-
ferent conclusions.
5 3
The notion that self-serving inferences are pervasive and hard to
disentangle from business justifications indicates an interesting con-
nection between social psychology and conventional economics.
Though a clear violation of the standard rationality assumption, this
form of inference offers a reason to expect people to behave the way
economists predict-in the pursuit of self-interest-even though they
deny in good faith that they are acting in anything but a fair and rea-
12 This is emphasized in Brown, supra note 148, at 651-60 (noting that denial, ra-
tionalization, self-aggrandizement, and attributional egotism are ego-defensive behav-
iors that may lead to ultimate failure); see alsoJennifer A. Chatman et al., The Managed
Thought: The Role of Self-Justification and Impression Management in Organizational Settings,
in THE THINKING ORGANIZATION, supra note 20, at 191, 209-10 (noting that organiza-
tions put substantial effort into rationalizing actions and events); Hayward &
Hambrick, supra note 139, at 107 (noting that success reinforces a CEO's stature but
often leads to self-serving attributions rather than self-critical ones). In turn, this
sense of entitlement to the status quo (or aspirations built on it) may trigger a host of
cognitions and behaviors designed to cling to it. For instance, one of the standard bi-
ases identified in the literature (under the heading of prospect theory) suggests that
people will take greater risks in order to avoid a loss than to seek a gain. See, e.g., Amos
Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Rational Choice and the Framing of Decisions, 59 J. Bus.
S251, S258 (1986) ("A significant property of the value function, called loss aversion, is
that the response to losses is more extreme than the response to gains."). Accord-
ingly, self-serving managerial biases may ultimately lead to risky decisions to preserve
the status quo, all hidden from consciousness in the name of "businessjudgment."
"' This leads to the natural point that there is not likely to be a single corporate
culture, but many subcultures with greater or lesser linkages. Because corporate dis-
closure tends to be in the hands of a small group at the top of the organization, it
would not be surprising to find self-serving interpretation a significant influence on
the content of filings and official publicity.
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sonable fashion.TM As ethicists increasingly recognize, antisocial be-
havior in business settings may be less the product of base moral cor-
ruption than of the ability of normal people in stressful environments
to distort and rationalize.'55 In this sense, self-serving inferences may
be particularly useful in understanding the nature and persistence of
agency costs and the moral hazards in organizational economics.
5. Bundling the Stories
Although each of the foregoing behavioral biases is interesting by
itself, the practical implications follow from their interplay. Burgel-
man's story of Intel recounted at the beginning of this Article' 56 is es-
sentially one of senior management's inertial resistance to the discon-
firmation of a highly success-oriented schema, albeit in a setting
where learning ultimately did occur. As such, accounts of why com-
panies make misleading disclosures should seek to integrate the vari-
ous biases. And from these biases, it is easy to tell a generic story be-
hind the kind of fraud allegation involving Apple Computer,5 7 Time-
Warner,' Polaroid,5 9 and many other defendants in the "false opti-
mism" cases. In most of these cases, a highly successful organization
undertook a course of action with respect to some product or finan-
cial strategy and was sued for not disclosing some bits of adverse in-
154 For this reason, the kinds of selfish "last period" behavior that Arlen and Carney
describe, see supra notes 40-44, 46 and accompanying text (discussing Arlen and
Carney's theory), is likely to be subject to self-deception. The managers engaged in
such behavior will not recognize it as such but will develop business-oriented rationali-
zations.
155 See Russel Hardin, The Psychology of Business Ethics, in CODES OF CONDUCr, supra
note 149, at 342, 359 ("At first cut, it is plausible that there is far more failure of ra-
tionality than morality in organizations .... ."); Barry A. Stein & Rosabeth M. Kanter,
Why Good People Do Bad Things: A Retrospective on the Hubble Fiasco, ACAD. MGMT.
EXEcUTIVE, Nov. 1993, at 58, 62 (using the Hubble Telescope project as a paradigm
for "normal accidents" in organizations and concluding that "the Hubble project
failed because of faulty mental images; images reified in the project organization, in
the relationships it fostered and thus, in the very process of operationalizing the total
concept of a space telescope").
'16 See Burgelman, supra note 8, and accompanying text.
117 See In re Apple Computer Sec. Litig, 886 F.2d 1109, 1119 (9th Cir. 1989)
(finding triable issue as to whether optimistic statements were misleading).
'3s See In re Time Warner Sec. Litig., 9 F.3d 259, 261 (2d Cir. 1993) (deciding the
question of "whether a corporation has a duty to update somewhat optimistic predic-
tions... when it appears that [they] will not be realized").
' Backman v. Polaroid Corp., 910 F.2d 10, 16 (1st Cir. 1990) (en banc) (noting




formation later found in the company's files. This is precisely the
kind of situation where each of the biases can readily operate: The
firm was successful, and no doubt had a good deal of aggregate self-
esteem; the adverse bits of information were slow in coming and in-
consistent with well-established schemas; and there was a heavy com-
mitment to the success of the projects. It is perfectly plausible that,
especially in the first small steps toward committing to the project-a
point of very high ambiguity-individual managers were particularly
optimistic. In the early stages of the project, this optimistic schema
was resistant to the first (still ambiguous) bits of potentially discon-
firming information. By the time their seriousness started to become
clearer, there was a high degree of commitment to strengthen the
prevailing beliefs, not to mention strong political reasons for preserv-
ing the status quo. Moreover, by that time the managers were com-
mitted to their publicly expressed optimism, from which they could
not easily step away, even as the signs of trouble became palpable.
Only at that late stage was there a truly deliberate form of dissem-
bling. The temporal interplay between initial overoptimism (leading
one to underestimate the risk of later dilemmas at the beginning of a
course of action) and the commitment bias (leading toward continua-
tion once those first steps are completed)-an optimism-commitment
"whipsaw'-is an especially interesting explanation for why otherwise
good people often find themselves responsible for bad behavior)'
°
We can also draw some important connections between the or-
ganizational-cognition accounts discussed earlier in this section 6' and
the informational account offered in Part II. 62 Information flow is
likely to be distorted not only (or even so much) by conscious distor-
tion, but also by biased interpretation.6 To the extent that managers
exhibit both cognitive conservatism and an optimistic-or self-
serving-frame of reference, fewer danger signs will qualify for re-
porting treatment as unusual, and those that do will tend to have a
positive spin. This more subtle winnowing and revisionism is re-
,6 See John M. Darley, How Organizations Socialize Individuals into Evildoing, in
CODES OF CONDUCT, supra note 149, at 13, 16-25 (discussing fragmentation of infor-
mation and commitment to courses of action).
161 See supra Part III.A.1-4.
112 See supra Part II.A.
It See ARROW, supra note 60, at 57 (noting the possibility of bias in information
flow). For this reason, I would revise the analysis in Part II to reduce the emphasis on
deliberate information distortion and put in its place the assumption that a good bit of
reporting is in good faith, but nonetheless misleading.
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peated at each relay point, with predictable effects on the final mes-
164
sage.
B. Can Biases Persist?
The tension between the orthodox economic and the alternative
social-science accounts of organizational behavior is most clearly
posed in a single question: If business firms exist in competitive envi-
ronments, will not market forces weed out those firms that act in a
less-than-rational, and hence inefficient, fashion?6 In other words,
should we not expect those firms with unrealistic belief systems that
do not learn from their errors to disappear, leaving only those that
have successfully countered the problem of cognitive bias? This Dar-
winian question is particularly apt because the problems of manage-
rial myopia and excessive optimism are hardly unknown within the
business community; scores of books, consultants, and educational
programs exist to alert managers to them and point to ways of avoid-
ing them.'66 Many companies have adopted structures designed spe-
cifically to avoid biases in the decisionmaking process. 1
7
Answering this question is the most important item on the behav-
ioral-research agenda. Before turning to a set of responses, however,
it should be emphasized that even if competitive forces do gradually
weed out firms that generate unrealistic belief systems, the process of
decisionmaking remains descriptively interesting. Our immediate ef-
fort is to explain why companies might deceive the stock markets, and
to see what this says about securities law. Unless we make the strong
" Argyris and Sch6n, for example, contend in a review of Burgelman's account of
Intel's cognitive blindness that senior management's myopia can be only a partial ex-
planation for its inability to hold its competitive lead. Their additional explanation is
that "defensive" breakdowns in communication prevented senior management from
becoming fully aware of the possibility of the loss of position. See ARGYRIS & SCHON,
supra note 8, at 218-21.
'63 See supra note 111 (discussing the general debate on this subject between
economists and psychologists). For a legal perspective, see Roberta Romano, A Com-
ment on Information Overload, Cognitive Illusions and Their Implications for Public Policy, 59
S. CAL. L. REV. 313 (1986).
' Some examples of books or articles that specifically address organizational
"debiasing" are BAZERMAN, supra note 128, at 196-99;JANIS & MANN, supra note 116, at
367-404;JAMES G. MARCH, A PRIMER ON DECISION MAKING (1994); and Mary Reis Louis
& Robert I. Sutton, Switching Cognitive Gears: From Habits of Mind to Active Thinking, 44
HUM. REL. 55 (1991).
"' Some banks, for example, keep their work-out teams separate from their lend-
ing groups to avoid the commitment bias. See Staw, supra note 142, at 585 (discussing
a comparative study examining two banks coping with delinquent loans).
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and unrealistic assumption that overly optimistic or otherwise biased
organizations never even enter markets in which more rational com-
petitors exist, the category of companies that might be charged with
fraud will always include some that are at risk of being eliminated be-
cause of their bias, but have not yet been. This "temporary entrant"
category-with some hyperbole, the corporate equivalent of
Barnum's new sucker born every minutel'--would still be of signifi-
cance to understanding the nature and sources of corporate decep-
tion. Indeed, given that corporate failure of some sort or another is a
common precursor to- class-action litigation, it may be a particularly
important category. We need not rest here, however, for there are
other survivability accounts that deserve careful consideration, each
interesting by itself but, like the biases themselves, probably most
powerful in combination.
1. Contingency, Imperfect Competition, and the Limits of
Learning from Experience
The first possible answer to the question of why competition does
not assure organizational rationality is an obvious one: There is no
such thing as a fixed or immutable organizational belief system. Al-
though corporate cultures do allow for a certain degree of stability
even when there is substantial turnover of key personnel, they can
and do shift over time. The most obvious example of this is what
March and his colleagues refer to as a competency trap. 69 A firm may
Lynn Stout has made a similar point regarding investor behavior. See Lynn A.
Stout, Are Stock Markets Costly Casinos? Disagreement, Market Failure, and Securities Regula-
tion, 81 VA. L. REv. 611, 639-40 (1995) (noting that each new generation of investors
has a subset of investors who are overly optimistic of their abilities to trade).
"9 SeeBarbara Levitt &James G. March, Organizational Learning, 14 ANN. REV. SOC.
319, 322 (1988) ("[A] competency trap can occur when favorable performance within
an inferior procedure leads an organization to accumulate more experience with it,
thus keeping experience with a superior procedure inadequate to make it rewarding
to use."); see also Danny Miller, What Happens After Success?: The Perils of Excellence 31J.
MGMT. STUD. 325, 326 (1994) ("[M]anagers tend to attribute success to some pet pol-
icy, strategy or process, which as a result, becomes resistant to change."). Levitt and
March also stress, as do many other theorists, the difficulties associated with learning
from experience in any situation where feedback is not both unambiguous and
prompt, something rarely observed in business settings. See Levitt & March, supra, at
320 (stating that routines "adapt to experience incrementally in response to feed-
back"); see also, e.g., Berndt Behmer, In One Word: Not from Experienc inJUDGMENT AND
DECISION MAKING 705, 719 (Hal R. Arkes & Kenneth R. Hammond eds., 1986)
(concluding that "experience often gives us very little information to learn from"); Ed
Bukszar & Terry Connolly, Hindsight Bias and Strategic Choice: Some Problems in Learning
from Experience, 31 ACAD. MGMT.J. 628, 630 (1988) (noting the presence of hindsight
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act with savvy in the early stages of its development and achieve a fair
level of market success. At that point, it establishes a reputation and
perhaps a protectable market niche (through intellectual-property
protection or proprietary internal knowledge) that give it a natural
advantage over its competition. As the firm ages, this advantage may
generate free cash flow that provides an additional buffer from mar-
ketplace forces.'70
Even orthodox economists recognize that at this point, the power
of competitive forces can diminish and the firm will turn inward in its
behavior. 17' Under the standard account, that facilitates managerial
entrenchment and selfish behavior by incumbent executives (to
which we can add, based on the self-deception discussion in the pre-
vious section, the possibility of self-serving inference perceived by the
incumbent managers as if it were good business judgment).1n With
product-market forces blunted, labor-market forces become less
pressing, especially if the managers have invested much human capi-
tal in the particular firm. And, as is increasingly well recognized, the
third principal kind of market force-capital-marketplace influence-
can be marginal, at least until a crisis. 73 Eventually, of course, the
bias in strategic decisionmaking); Colin F. Camerer, Comment on Noll and Krier "Some
Implications of Cognitive Psychology forRisk Regulation", 19J. LEGAL STUD. 791, 794 (1990)
("[E]valuation must be careful, frequent, and quick... to learn from results."); supra
note 111.
'70 Cf Michael C. Jensen, Agency Costs of Free Cash Row, Corporate Finance and Take-
overs, 76 AM. ECON. REv., May 1986, at 323, 323 ("Payouts to shareholders reduce the
resources under managers' control, thereby reducing managers' power, and making it
more likely they will incur the monitoring of the capital markets which occur when the
firm must obtain new capital. Financing projects internally avoids this monitoring and
the possibility the funds will be unavailable or available only at high explicit prices."
(citation omitted)).
17, Agency costs will vary depending on the competitive environment, which may
be strong or weak. See, e.g., Michael C. Jensen, The Modern Industrial Revolution, Exit,
and the Failure of Internal Control Systems, 48J. FIN. 831, 870 (1993) ("[N]o longer can we
assume managers automatically act to maximize firm value."). For a critical review
from a legal perspective, see Manuel A. Utset, Towards a Bargaining Theory of the Firm,
80 CORNELL L. REV. 540, 554-56 (1995).
'7 See supra notes 148-64 and accompanying text.
173 The firm with minimal needs for external capital has little to worry about in
terms of access. The likelihood that capital providers (for example, shareholders) will
use their legal rights to demand replacement of existing management, though a grow-
ing possibility, is still the exception rather than the rule. See, e.g., Bernard S. Black,
Agents Watching Agents: The Promise of Institutional Investor Voice, 39 UCLA L. REv. 811,
819 (1992) (noting that institutional investors are no longer entirely passive, but that
proxy fights are still rare). Nor is it entirely clear that monitoring shareholders neces-
sarily have a superior (or unbiased) perspective. See, e.g., D. Gordon Smith, Corporate
[Vol. 146: 101
ORGANIZED ILLUSIONS
firm that is too inward looking may fail as technology evolves and
competitors are able to alter the competitive environment. The
point, however, is that because of variations in the intensity of compe-
tition, we cannot assume that firms with bias-filled cultures will neces-
sarily die quickly. Their biases may persist for unusually long periods
of time. The result, for our purposes, is an enlargement of the cate-
gory of companies that at any given time might be susceptible to the
kinds of disclosure distortion that come from cognitive bias. Indeed,
there is a strong strand in the "organizational ecology" literature that
suggests that eventually nearly all successful firms are destined for
failure as their perceptions and routines ill-prepare them for changes
in technologies and market conditions.' 74
Quite separately, we should also take note of the difficulties asso-
ciated with organizational learning and rational choice. Once a firm
has exploited some technology and established itself in its market, it
becomes increasingly difficult to discern what the best strategic op-
tion is. And when some choice is made, it is difficult to tell whether it
was successful or not. Signals from the environment are highly am-
biguous and often delayed. Nearly all failures can be ascribed, if ob-
servers are so inclined, to intervening and unforeseen situational fac-
tors rather than flaws in the decision.' 75 Such environments frustrate
organizational learning and rational decisionmaking. In this kind of
setting, rational choice readily gives way to superstitious learning, and
decisions and processes that are more symbolic than real, 76 not be-
cause the company is not motivated to act rationally, but rather be-
Governance and Managerial Incompetence: Lessons from KmasT 74 N.C. L. REV. 1037, 1104-
10 (1996) (doubting whether shareholder activism adds value to corporations).
174 See Michael T. Hannan & John Freeman, Structural Inertia and Organizational
Change, 49 AM. SOc. REv. 149, 149 (1984) (arguing "that selection processes tend to
favor organizations whose structures are difficult to change"). More recently, there
has been greater attention to the possibility of organizational adaptation to new envi-
ronments, although the substantial likelihood that success (ultimately) breeds failure
is still recognized. See, e.g., Terry L. Amburgey & Hayagreeva Rao, Organizational Ecol-
ogy: Past, Present, and Future Directions, 39 AcAD. MGMT. REv. 1265, 1275 (1996) (ques-
tioning whether established firms become inert and unable to respond to market
changes); John M. Usher & Martin G. Evans, Life and Death Along Gasoline Alley: Dar-
winian and Lamarckian Processes in a Differentiating Population, 39 ACAD. MGMT. REV.
1428, 1458-62 (1996) (concluding that market change occurs both due to organiza-
tional adaptation and by outright replacement of one firm by another).
'75 In business settings, there is often confusion over whether a decision was poor
or simply implemented badly by others. In this sense, the potential fault of others, as
well as simply bad luck, can be confounding.
176 See supra note 169.
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cause environmental signals leave a void soon filled in the pursuit of
other, more inward-looking needs.
177
2. Adaptive Biases
The second set of explanations for why biases might persist is dif-
ferent and potentially more profound. Put simply, there is reason to
suspect that firms that inculcate certain types of belief systems may in
many settings be competitively superior to those that are more dog-
gedly "realistic." Though counterintuitive, this possibility finds a
great deal of support in the social-psychology research relating to in-
dividual and group behavior.
As noted, there are essentially two classes of bias. One is the kind
of bias arising naturally from bounded rationality and constraints on
cognitive-processing ability.178 At the level of the firm, it is quite pos-
sible that stable perceptions and routines are necessary to allow it to
focus on an objective and exploit it fully-even if the resulting tunnel
vision eventually poses significant risks in times of external change.' 9
This is the virtue of organizational cognitive conservatism. It can be
adaptive in two senses: First, it simplifies thinking by allowing the
firm to dismiss large amounts of information; second, it is often accu-
rate insofar as stability is more common than change."s In an am-
'7 Here again we should note the interplay with the information-flow analysis:
Learning is difficult to the extent that communication barriers (structural or cultural)
prevent senior executives from gaining a realistic picture of any given situation. See,
e.g., ARGYRIS & SCHO1N, supra note 8, at 211 (stressing "the 'inertial' lag of formal cor-
porate strategy in relation to shifting conditions in the competitive environment"). In
addition to all this, we should note one other element of contingency: Over time, a
firm's expectations will change, triggering other forms of bias that are related to the
perception of the status quo. See, e.g.,James G. March & Zur Shapira, Variable Risk Pref-
erences and the Focus of Attention, 99 PSYCHOL. REv. 172, 177 (1992) (discussing the "rate
of aspiration adjustment" and "focus-of-attention" effects on organization).
178 See supra note 113 (discussing purely cognitive biases).
179 In Kenneth Arrow's words, "the very pursuit of efficiency may lead to rigidity
and unresponsiveness to further change." ARROW, supra note 60, at 49. For a good
expression of this in the managerial literature, see DANNY MILLER, THE ICARUS
PARADOX (1990), and Miller, supra note 169, at 330. This is also a common theme in
the industrial-evolution literature. See, e.g., Michael T. Hannan & Glenn R. Carroll, An
Introduction to Organizational Ecology, in ORGANIZATIONS IN INDUSTRY 17, 23-25 (Glenn
R. Carroll & Michael T. Hannan eds., 1995) (explaining the challenges of structural
inertia in established firms); Rebecca M. Henderson & Kim B. Clark, Architectural Inno-
vation: The Reconfiguration of Existing Product Technologies and the Failure of Established
Firms, 35 ADMIN. SC. Q. 9, 16-19 (1990) (discussing the problems that market innova-
tions pose to well-established organizations).
'80 See Hal R. Arkes, Costs and Benefits ofJudgment Errors: Implications for Debiasing,
110 PSYCHOL. BULL. 486, 487-89 (1991) (describing benefits of biases in terms of sim-
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biguous environment, too much willingness to shift directions and
consider new possibilities makes reciprocal commitment difficult.
Conversely, in a stable atmosphere, individual managers and employ-
ees, as well as such external constituencies as customers and suppli-
ers, can rely on the firm to stick to a set of routines, and so are more
willing to "invest" in it for the intermediate-term future."" In sum,
one adaptive quality of narrow organizational perception is to focus
the firm's resources and attention on what it has for the time found
that it can do well 82 and avoid the informational paralysis that often
comes from seeing and thus dwelling on too many risks or opportuni-
ties.
The other kind of bias is the motivated one,18s and here we see a
more fascinating possibility. Much research on individual cognition
indicates that the most successful person, on average, tends not to be
the realist, but rather the optimist."' High levels of self-esteem and
self-efficacy are associated with aggressiveness, perseverance, and op-
timal risk-taking.8 These biases may be particularly adaptive in busi-
plified management of large amounts of data); Miller, supra note 121, at 118
(describing benefits of simplified focus in organizations).
"" See Walter W. Powell, Expanding the Scope of Institutional Analysis, in THE NEW
INsTrrUTIoNALIsM, supra note 6, at 183, 194 ("[E]stablished conceptions of the 'way
things are done' can be very beneficial; members of an organizational field can use
these stable expectations as a guide to action and a way to predict the behavior of oth-
ers.").
112 See Richard R- Nelson, Recent Evolutionary Theorizing About Economic Change, 33J.
EcON. LITERATURE 48, 79 (1995) ("[T]he set of things a firm can do well at any given
time is quite limited, and ... while firms certainly can learn to do new things, these
learning capabilities are also limited.").
i Seesupra note 113 (discussing motivational biases).
8 See FIsKE & TAYLOR, supra note 115, at 543-50 (discussing self-fulfilling prophe-
cies); SELIGMAN, supra note 133, at 112 ("[T]he successful corporation has its opti-
mists, dreamers, salesmen, and creators."); Pamela C. Regan et al., Unrealistic Optimism:
Self-Enhancement or Person Positivity2, 21 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1073,
1079-80 (1995) (finding that unrealistic optimism resulted in a greater chance of ex-
periencing positive, future life outcomes); Shelley E. Taylor & Peter M. GollwitzerEf-
fects of Mindset on Positive Illusions, 69 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 213, 224-25
(1995) (demonstrating that people tend to use positive thinking when implementing
goals); see also Albert Bandura, Human Agency in Social Cognitive Theory, 44 AM.
PsYCHOL. 1175, 1177 (1989) ("The successful.., fake an optimistic view of their per-
sonal efficiency to exercise influence over events that affect their lives."). From a legal
perspective, see Donald C. Langevoort, Ego, Human Behavior, and Law, 81 VA. L. REv.
853, 855-60 (1995) (discussing the cognitive mechanisms that promote self-esteem).
.. The efficacy of positive illusions is not uncontroversial. See Heath & Jourden,
supra note 132, at 113 (finding that positive illusions make people overly sensitive to
environmental feedback). It may be affected by matters of timing (for example, a lull
in the illusion immediately after a task). See Thomas Gilovich et al., Effect of Temporal
Perspective on Subjective Confidence 64J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL 552, 555 (1993)
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ness settings, where decisiveness and aggressiveness are considered
indicators of a successful manager.'86 Certainly, overconfidence at
times leads to disaster and severe career failure. Those who fail too
visibly are often weeded out. However, there. is little evidence that
successful managers learn humility very well. s7 Instead, they rechar-
acterize their minor failures in self-serving terms. They take the ap-
parent absence of major failures, maybe from luck as much as any-
thing else, as proof of superior skill. High levels of optimism and
confidence are not only good internal motivators, but they also influ-
ence others; exhibitions of confidence and optimism make people
more persuasive and influential." s
There is no reason to believe that the same would not be true for
organizational cultures generally." 9 In the same vein as David Kreps's
(discussing the potential impact of accountability for assessments immediately follow-
ing the task being assessed). From a research perspective, it is hard to determine
whether such illusions are the cause of positive behavior, or whether initial success
leads to high levels of optimism and control, thereby becoming a self-fulfilling proph-
ecy. For a well-known social cognitionist's expression of doubt as to the value of high
self-esteem (without doubting its power to affect cognition among large numbers of
people), see ROBYN M. DAwES, HOUSE OF CARDS 277-82 (1994).
186 SeeWEIcK, supra note 10, at 60 (noting the powerful adaptive effects of bold ac-
tion);James G. March & Zur Shapira, Managerial Perspectives on Risk and Risk Taking, 33
MGMT. SCI. 1404, 1414 (1987) ("[M)anagerial ideology also portrays a good manager
as being a risk taker."); Leslie E. Palich & D. Ray Bagby, Using Cognitive Theory to Explain
Entrepreneurial Risk-Taking. Challenging Conventional Wisdom, 10J. Bus. VENTURING 425,
434 (1995) ("When an entrepreneur pursues an activity that would be ignored or ne-
glected by a nonentrepreneur, it may be due to the entrepreneur's perception of a
positive outcome rather than to differences in predisposition to risk."); see also
Kathleen M. Sutcliffe, Wat Executives Notice: Accurate Perceptions in Top Management
Teams, 37 ACAD. MGMT.J. 1360, 1373-74 (1994) (describing the importance of accurate
managerial perception of environmental characteristics so that the organizations can
tailor their strategies and structures to the environment's conditions).
187 See March & Shapira, supra note 186, at 1414 (noting that because managers
believe that they can change the odds, they are more prone to accept risks than they
might otherwise be).
s See Margaret T. Lee & Richard Ofshe, The Impact of Behavioral Style and Status
Characteristics on Social Influence: A Test of Two Competing Theories, 44 SOC. PSYCHOL. Q.
73, 80 (1981) (discussing how variations in demeanor significantly affect observers'
decisions); cf. Bernard E. Whitley, Jr. & Martin S. Greenberg, The Role of Eyewitness Con-
fidence in Juror Perceptions of Credibility, 16 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 387, 403 (1986)
(finding that self-confidence leads to more credible testimony). Sociobiologists sug-
gest that self-deception is so pervasive and adaptive precisely because it leads to an im-
proved ability to influence (and deceive) others, something seen as a key survival trait.
See ROBERT TRIVERS, SOCIAL EVoLUTION 415-20 (1985) (discussing the logic of self-
deception).
189 There is support for the view that the role of positive illusions is enhanced in
group settings; groups may accentuate positive feedback and offer forms of rationali-
zation to avoid the negative. See Heath & Jourden, supra note 132, at 114 (discussing
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hypothesis that a culture that emphasizes trust can allow the organiza-
tion to signal more effectively the credibility of its commitments,' 90 we
observe that an optimistic culture can have a number of adaptive vir-
tues. It is an ideal motivator, creating the expectation of future
growth and profitability that leads individuals to invest their human
capital in the firm more willingly and to defer present consumption
in favor of future rewards. Firms with "can-do" cultures will thereby
generate higher levels of internal effort and, by projecting self-
confidence, be more successful in attracting external resources.1 9'
Conversely, an optimistic culture can blind managers to the kind of
anxiety about the future that might otherwise trigger both the sort of
self-serving inference and the selfish "last period" kind of behavior
that might operate to a firm's detriment. 92 Faced with risk or trouble,
agents will more likely persist in normal, functional activity than act
self-protectively if the firm has successfully inculcated a belief system
that rests on images of efficacy and control.
Of particular interest here is the relationship between optimism
and trust. In recent years, scholars have come to recognize that the
pervasiveness of trust within an organization is positively correlated
with efficiency and productivity. In turn, optimism should correlate
with trust' 3 In any joint enterprise, the potential for opportunistic
the buffering effect of groups); see also Yechiel Klar et al., Nonunique Invulnerability:
Singular Versus Distributional Probabilities and Unrealistic Optimism in Comparative Risk
Judgments, 67 ORG. BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 229, 241 (1996) (extending
unrealistic optimism tojudgments about group peers). For an expression of the view
that certain kinds of biases (including optimistic ones) are more often found in start-
up firms than well-established ones, see Lowell W. Busenitz &Jay B. Barney, Differences
Between Entrepreneurs and Managers in Large Organizations: Biases and Heuristics in Strate-
gicDecision-Making, 12J. BUS. VENTURING 9 (1997).
"0 See generally Kreps, supra note 109, at 106-08 (suggesting the influence of corpo-
rate reputation on perceptions about future behavior).
91' See text accompanying note 49.
2 In other words, an optimistic culture or subculture may be an agency-cost re-
duction mechanism, thereby justifying substantial managerial attention to nurturing
the most desirable set of beliefs. In some ways, we can generalize this point by saying
that cultures mediate the egocentric perceptions of most human beings. In strong
cultures, selfishness and self-serving inferences are dampened. But cultures cannot be
manufactured at will; it takes persuasion to influence the collective perceptions of the
group members. Hope and optimism, in turn, are particularly persuasive images when
they can be communicated plausibly. Cf Langevoort, supra note 3, at 633-34 (describ-
ing the motivations of investors to trust in optimistic advice).
19s On the importance of trust, especially in periods of organizational stress, see
Aneil K. Mishra, Organizational Response to Crisis: The Centrality of Trust, in TRUST IN
ORGANIZATIONS, supra note 72, at 261. See also Deborah A. DeMott, Trust and Tension
Within Corporations, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 1308, 1309-10 (1996) (discussing the role of
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behavior must be balanced against the rewards for cooperation. The
greater the sense of future well-being from joint effort, the less likely
opportunism becomes. Observable (and hence cascading) patterns
of cooperation can then emerge-including reduced distortion in
lines of information flow'9 -- facilitating the development of a culture
that has a higher-than-normal level of trust.
In light of the potentially adaptive virtue of optimism and related
biases (for instance, the illusion of control), we can see how social
forces that lead groups of managers not to see some risks (or to con-
strue them unrealistically) could have a positive payoff on average.
While there are serious costs associated with ignoring danger signs in
a small subset of cases, these costs may be outweighed by the profit-
ability produced by the benign influences of organizational self-
deception in others. When we couple this with the other virtue of
risk deflection, the ability to maintain consistency and focus, we can
see at least a plausible response to the "survival of the rational" claims
of conventional economics. Indeed, although little of it relates spe-
cifically to organizational behavior, much of the work on the persis-
tence of unrealistic optimism has been generated by sociobiologists
working from strong Darwinian assumptions. ' 5
trust when parties enter a relationship in pursuit of personal economic advantage);
William G. Ouchi, Markets, Bureaucracies and Clans, 25 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 129, 130 (1980)
(discussing the impact of trust on transaction costs). On the psychological mecha-
nisms in group trust, see Debra Meyerson et al., Swift Trust and Temporary Groups, in
TRUST IN ORGANIZATIONS, supra note 72, at 166. An implicit understanding along
these lines thus facilitates thousands of daily interactions. See supra note 105. An in-
teresting body of scholarship, in both law and economics, has considered the effects of
breaches of implicit contract (a trust concept) on efficiency and morale. See, e.g.,
Bruce Chapman, Trust, Economic Rationality and the Corporate Fiduciary Obligation, 43 U.
TORONTO LJ. 547 (1993) (challenging the contractual view of the corporation be-
cause of its failure to account for the duties of loyalty and trust). It would not be sur-
prising to find that cultures that were highly optimistic generated the highest level of
hope and thus the most intense feeling of betrayal when the optimistic bubble was
popped. See Chip Heath et al., The Strategic Management of the Entitlement Process in the
Employment Relationship, 14 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 75, 80-82 (1993) (discussing the psy-
chological processes operating to effectuate this result, particularly the problem of
self-serving inference).
'9 See Mishra, supra note 193, at 273-75 (discussing trust as a "prerequisite to un-
distorted communication"); see also Karlene H. Roberts & Charles A. O'Reilly, III, Fail-
ures in Upward Communication in Organizations: Three Possible Culprits, 17 ACAD. MGMT. J.
205, 208-09 (1974) (discussing the importance of trust as a facilitation of information
exchange).
'95 See generally LIONEL TIGER, OPTIMISM (1979) (discussing the phenomenon of
personal optimism); supra note 188. While on the subject of evolution, we should
sound a note of caution. For a variety of reasons, our economy is evolving away from
an emphasis on firms that make a long-term commitment to a particular technology in
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C. The Legal Implications of Bias
If corporations habitually tend toward cognitive conservatism,
overcommitment, overoptimism, and selfish inference, there is a con-
siderable likelihood that the subjective forward-looking elements of
their disclosure and publicity will have the potential to mislead. Of
course, market professionals and other savvy investors will discount
many kinds of corporate hype and, at least in those settings where ef-
ficiency properties predominate, such disclosures may have minimal
market-price impact. 96 On the assumption, however, that managers
do have unique access to certain kinds of risk-related information
such that some marketplace dependency on managerial inference is
inevitable, 197 the possibility of socially inefficient market-price distor-
favor of more flexible mechanisms for producing goods and delivering services. See
Gilson, supra note 22, at 340-41 (describing the nexus between corporate governance
mechanisms and diminishing product life span). Perhaps that shift will create a set-
ting in which narrow vision and focus, and other myopic kinds of organizational biases
we have identified, will have less capacity to survive than they have had previously.
Surely, we must concede that the survivability of these biases is historically contingent,
and research that looks at the current or past environment may not describe the fu-
ture. For commentary on the balance between stability and adaptability, see Lance B.
Kurke, Does Adaptation Preclude Adaptability?: Strategy and Performanc4 in INSTITUTIONAL
PATTERNS AND ORGANIZATIONS 199 (Lynne G. Zucker ed., 1988). Although these
points are well taken, my intuition is that both optimism and self-serving inference are
likely to remain pervasive even if the virtues of narrowed focus and conservatism
erode. Cf Meyerson et al., supra note 193, at 186 (determining that positive illusions
contribute to the resilience of swift trust in a temporary group).
196 See, e.g., COX ETAL., supra note 11, at 61 (noting that "information as to the cost
and performance of [a] new computer series was already widely known in the industry,
so that [a] misstatement did not affect the mix of information" (citing Beissinger v.
Rockwood Computer Corp., 529 F. Supp. 770, 781-82 (E.D. Pa. 1981))); Roger J.
Dennis, Mandatory Disclosure Theory and Management Projections: A Law and Economics
Perspective, 46 MD. L. REv. 1197, 1206 (1987) (finding that investors did not respond
positively to enhanced mandatory continuous disclosure due to the efficient-market
model); RonaldJ. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency,
70 VA. L. REv. 549, 635-42 (1984) (questioning the effect on prices based on manda-
tory disclosure requirements). Investment analysts and other professional investors
can, in many cases, test management's inferences by contacting customers, suppliers,
and other experts for alternative points of view about the company's prospects. To
date, neither legal scholars nor economists have specified the point at which profes-
sional-investor reliance on managerial inference is apt to occur. There is a sense that
even professionals may be subject to some predictable biases, notwithstanding market
constraints. See, e.g., Tilman Ehrbeck & Robert Waldmann, Why Are Professional Fore-
casters Biased?: Agency Versus Behavioral Explanations, 111 Q.J. ECON. 21 (1996) (discuss-
ing how to test for the biases of forecasters); see also Langevoort, supra note 12, at 869
(finding that "investment analysts and economic forecasters [may] overreact to certain
information").
197 Along these lines, one of the few areas where there is mandatory disclosure of
some kind of future-oriented information is in the Management Discussion & Analysis
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tion remains. The normative question then looms: What changes to
the prevailing rules of securities regulation might we consider in light
of this heretofore unexplored possibility?
The most natural response is consistent with the points made ear-. - 198
lier about the relevance of information-flow blockages. If we are se-
riously interested in deterring corporate deception, then fraud liabil-
ity should not turn on conscious awareness by the specific senior
executives responsible for corporate communications of the mislead-
ing nature of their misstatements or omissions. I have doubts about
how often, in hindsight, judges and juries would actually recognize an
instance of cognitive blindness and refuse to impose liability.'9 At
least in principle, however, an awareness requirement much too read-
ily protects the kinds of marketplace distortions that securities regula-
tion wants to prevent.
To overcome this, the law would want to create incentives (if not
direct requirements) to force the "debiasing" of corporate inference.
Within the scienter-based regime of Rule 10b-5, the first step toward
achieving this end would be to develop a definition of corporate sci-
enter that focuses on the attribution of knowledge to the firm. Such
emphasis would echo a comparable doctrinal development in the law
of insider trading, within which liability turns on simple possession of
information rather than identifying a specific misuse of it by natural
persons within the organization."° In response, corporations wishing
to avoid liability would have an incentive to bring into the disclosure
portion of required SEC filings. The optimistic bias of these disclosures has been ob-
served. See Moses L. Pava & Marc J. Epstein, How Good Is MD&A as an Investment Tool,
175 J. Acar. 51, 52-53 (1993) (noting that the SEC's original goals in requiring this
section may not be satisfied in practice). Yet it still has the capacity to reveal new in-
formation and thus affect prices. See Stephen H. Bryan, Incremental Information Content
of Required Disclosures Contained in Management Discussion and Analysis, 72 ACar. REV.
285, 298 (1997) (discussing the short-term price impact of the SEC's mandatory dis-
closure requirement). Presumably, analysts apply some sort of bias discount that var-
ies depending on issuers' reputation for credibility.
199 See supra notes 84-96.
'9 For reasons having to do with the hindsight bias as well as the tendency to at-
tribute blame to dispositional rather than situational factors, juries may not be moved
by claims of lack of awareness based on cognitive bias. See Langevoort, supra note 6
(manuscript at 34-35) (suggesting that juries are motivated to explain bad events in
terms of malfeasance). If this is the case, we might have too much enforcement, at
least within the traditional understanding of the scienter requirement.
See United States v. Teicher, 987 F.2d 112, 120-21 (2d Cir. 1993) (suggesting
that insider-trading liability does not depend upon a showing that the information led
to the trading and that "knowing possession" is enough); LANGEVOORT, supra note 34,
§ 3.04 (discussing the inconsistent case law in this area).
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process persons not subject (or less subject) to the same biases. De-
pending on the type of information in question, management con-
sultants, accounting firms, and law firms could offer a useful, though
by no means fail-safe, therapeutic intervention."'
In areas of special concern, the law could go one step further and
mandate such intervention. In essence, the due-diligence require-
ment for underwriters and accountants under section 11 of the Secu-
rities Act of 1933'02 is based on a mistrust of management as the ex-
203clusive source of firm-specific information, thereby requiring a
"bonding" of disclosure completeness and accuracy by outside profes-
sionals (who in turn also have their own reputational interests at
stake). While this historic mistrust is probably based more on the fear
of deliberate cheating than cognitive bias, the independent evalua-
tion of data involved in a due-diligence investigation provides a useful
antidote to bias in initial public offerings and other settings where it
is both required and practicable.2l
Securities regulation could also choose to extend this more
broadly to some standard requiring ongoing disclosures by public
companies. Requiring auditor certification of some kinds of projec-
20, See generally Langevoort, supra note 6 (focusing primarily on the involvement of
lawyers in the disclosure process). Some doubts about the accountant's motivation to
detect fraud are expressed in Max H. Bazerman et al., The Impossibility of Auditor Inde-
pendence, SLOAN MGNIT. REV., Summer 1997, at 89. See also PFEFFER, supra note 126, at
249-54 (discussing consultants' biases in the process).
2' 15 U.S.C. § 77k(b) (3) (1994).
2"' See, e.g., Michael P. Dooley, The Effects of Civil Liability on Investment Banking and
the New Issues Market, 58 VA. L. REv. 776, 802-10 (1972) (discussing the philosophy of
section 11 liability); Merritt B. Fox, ShefRegistration, Integrated Disclosure and Undeumiter
Due Diligence: An Economic Analysis, 70 VA. L. REV. 1005, 1032 (1984) (concluding that
underwriter due diligence improves the quality of market information); see also Reinier
H. Kraakman, Corporate Liability Strategies and the Costs of Legal Controls, 93 YALE L.J. 857,
897 (1984) (discussing the impact of such gatekeeper liability).
Indeed, it might be possible to tell the story of the most famous of all due-
diligence cases, Escott v. BarChris Construction Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643, 688 (S.D.N.Y.
1968) (holding that the defendants failed to meet the burden of proof that damages
suffered by the plaintiffs were caused by factors other than material misrepresenta-
tions and omissions in the prospectus), as one in which (in contrast to the court's in-
terpretation) management optimistically underestimated the severity of the risk asso-
ciated with building bowling alleys for customers. Had they done their jobs, the
various professionals might have introduced a less rosy assessment of that risk. To
simplify, the essence of the fraud allegations in BarChris was the nondisclosure of con-
tractual provisions relating to the company's construction projects, pushing much of
the risk of marketplace failure on the company. See id. at 653-54. Without questioning
the court's conclusion relating to the materiality of this information, it is not implau-
sible that senior management failed to appreciate the nature and extent of the risk it
was retaining because of some biased perception.
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tions and estimates would create this sort of third-party intervention
in an area highly susceptible to bias. Even more aggressive would be
a required due-diligence investigation of publicly traded firms every
205three or five years. Conversely, the SEC might take a stronger stand
against the loss of due diligence that has come from the gradual shift
of more and more capital raising to the shelf-registration system.
That system preserves due-diligence liability but makes it practically
impossible to do it well once the registrant has decided that the mar-
ket window of opportunity is open, but may close in a day or two.06
There is no lack of possible interventions, but two concerns
should also be evident. First, note the difficulty in achieving the
gains. With respect to highly subjective kinds of construal-for in-
stance, those regarding research and development, product quality,
or marketing-"audit" or due-diligence techniques may not work par-
ticularly well. Information of that sort cannot easily be separated
from the perceptions of those with firsthand knowledge of the busi-
ness. The natural response of managers and other employees faced
with attempts by skeptical third parties to assess their objectivity may
well be either to freeze the third parties out of the information loop
or engage in impression-management techniques that blur the pre-
vailing reality.
2 7
Second, note the magnitude of the precaution costs involved. As
discussed earlier, investors pay heavily for third-party investigations,
both in the direct fees paid by the issuer to the professionals for their
time and effort, and in the risk premium to compensate for their li-
ability exposure.08 Whether this delivers fair value, given savvy inves-
tors' ability to filter out some biases and plumb alternative sources of
SeeJames D. Cox, The Fundamentals of an Electronic-Based Federal Securities Act, 75
WASH. U. L.Q. 857, 883 (1997) (proposing a continuous reporting system, perhaps
every third year).
2w See Committee on Fed. Regulation of Sec., Report of the Task Force on Sellers'Due
Diligence and Similar Defenses Under the Federal Securities Laws, 48 Bus. LAw. 1185, 1207
(1993) (noting the inadequate time available for underwriters to discharge their due-
diligence responsibilities adequately).
207 In addition, it is possible that cognitive biases may affect the ability of such out-
siders to perceive the risk, especially if they are not really outsiders but have some con-
tinuing relationship (and commitment) to the company. With respect to auditors, see
Bazerman et al., supra note 201, suggesting that it is "psychologically impossible for
auditors to maintain their objectivity," id. at 90; and Mark W. Nelson & William R.
Kenney, The Effect of Ambiguity on Loss Contingency ReportingJudgments, 72 AccT. REV.
257 (1997), concluding that "users may expect a more conservative reaction to ambi-
guity than auditors provide," id. at 259.




information anyway, is open to question. We might also worry
about whether shifting to a possession-based corporate-scienter re-
gime, or one of enhanced due-diligence responsibilities, would make
it too easy for plaintiffs to bring suits of questionable merit, which
nonetheless force settlement, causing an unnecessary shifting of
money from shareholders of the issuer to a small class of purchasers
210or sellers, and their attorneys.
These are fairly direct costs. But one is also entitled to ask
whether biases built on overoptimism, at least, are ones with which we
really want to interfere through legal intervention, even if we could.
If optimism is adaptive in that companies do better if they develop be-
lief systems that deflect awareness of the seriousness of some kinds of
risks, is it really the kind of belief system we want to discourage? So-
cial psychologists suggest that the class of persons least prone to ex-
cessive optimism and the illusion of control is the clinically de-
pressed. 211 We run the risk of having third-party interventions causing
official company statements that, if successful, dampen the internal
morale of the senior managers and perhaps the company culture as a
whole. Those that fall short of success simply operate as expensive
and disruptive monitoring systems with little to show in the way of
212improved disclosure.
Those uncomfortable with these various costs might be tempted
to move to the opposite extreme and seek to immunize overoptimism
from legal attack. Indeed, there has been a fascinating line of cases
See Stephen J. Choi, Company Registration: Toward a Status BasedAntifraud Regime,
64 U. CHI. L. REv. 567, 587 (1997) (discussing the ability of third parties to perform
gatekeeper functions).
210 Under the pleading standards put in place in 1995, plaintiffs face dismissal of
their suits if they cannot put forward facts giving rise to a strong inference of scienter.
See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b) (2) (Supp. 1995). In many ways, this is the most significant
hurdle imposed by the legislation. See ElliottJ. Weiss, The New Securities Fraud Pleading
Requirements: Speed Bump or Road Block?, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 675, 676 (1996) (concluding
that the pleading requirement is "more of a speed bump than a road block" for a
plaintiff because of the different factual requirements of different courts). It does
seem likely that plaintiffs are more likely to survive the motion to dismiss (and thereby
gain immense settlement leverage) if they are simply required to create an inference
that the truth was within the organization at large, rather than having to create the
inference that the corporate speaker knew the truth.
211 See FISKE & TAYLOR, supra note 115, at 214 (suggesting that individuals with
measured low self-esteem or moderate depression, or both, exhibit more accurate self-
appraisals).
212 My sense is that in many situations the lawyer's challenge is a severe one: Bi-
ased cultures may strongly resist meaningful public acknowledgment of the serious-
ness of risk, leading to boilerplate risk disclosure at best.
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in the 1990s, beginning with the Fourth Circuit's decision in Raab v.
213General Physics Corp., that goes substantially in this direction. Under
this view, general corporate statements of optimism are immaterial as
a matter of law. While at base this is just common sense-some
statements of optimism are so general and contentless (for example,
"This is a great company with a great future.") that we can hardly
imagine any investor seriously relying on it alone, or even a cluster of
similar platitudes-the cases themselves protect statements that are
far from standard puffery. Concern that this provides too much room
to deceive the reasonable investor has led other courts, like the First
Circuit in Shaw v. Digital Equipment Corp.,214 to limit the doctrine. In
terms of protecting reasonable reliance, the parsimonious use of this
doctrine is clearly correct. When viewed in context, general state-
ments of optimism can mislead."5 On the other hand, Raab and its
progeny do create the ability to weed out-without the need for fact-
intensive discovery into corporate state of mind-the kinds of cases
where optimistic bias, rather than intentional deceit, is particularly
216likely to have driven the allegedly misleading disclosure.
213 4 F.3d 286, 291 (4th Cir. 1993) (holding that predictions about future earnings
in annual report are immaterial); see also Eisenstadt v. Centel Corp., 113 F.3d 738, 746
(7th Cir. 1997) (holding that "investors would have expected no less" than optimistic
statements); Hillson Partners Ltd. Partnership v. Adage, Inc., 42 F.3d 204, 216-19 (4th
Cir. 1994) (holding that projected sales statements are not actionable); Malone v. Mi-
crodyne Corp., 26 F.3d 471, 479-80 (4th Cir. 1994) (holding that a statement express-
ing "comfort" with an analyst's prediction of a company's future earnings was not ac-
tionable); In re Gupta Sec. Litig., 900 F. Supp. 1217, 1234-35 (N.D. Cal. 1994) (holding
that the projected earnings had sufficient cautionary language to be nonactionable).
In addition, one could justify such a rule by reference to the possibility that an overly
optimistic corporate face is so natural and normal that the sophisticated market simply
assumes the presence of the bias. Seesupra text accompanying notes 49-51.
2" 82 F.3d 1194, 1213-14 (1st Cir. 1996) (overruling the district court and allowing
plaintiff's allegations of materially misleading "soft" statements in a prospectus to
stand).
215 Take, for example, a situation where independent analysts predicted a good
future, and management had a prior reputation for credibility. Here a positive gen-
eral'statement might have a lulling effect, even on professional investors.
211 While the Raab line of cases only protects general statements of optimism, there
are other possibilities open to one inclined to protect optimism. The new safe harbor
for forward-looking information protects projections and estimates by seasoned com-
panies if made either without actual knowledge of their falsity or with "meaningful
cautionary statements" accompanying them. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77z-2(c)(1)(A), 78u-
5(c) (1) (A) (Supp. 1995); see Carl W. Schneider &Jay A. Dubow, Forward-LookingInfor-
mation-Navigating in the Safe Harbor, 51 BUS. LAw. 1071, 1073 (1996) (discussing the
safe-harbor provisions for forward-looking statements after the Private Securities Liti-
gation Reform Act of 1995). This readily provides protection to optimistic disclosure
that complies with the fairly minimal protective standards. More broadly, one could
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The tensions for securities-law doctrine raised by the possibility of
bias are present with respect to all forms of publicity, but most impor-
tantly with respect to concealment cases. Under the so-called "duty to
update" adopted by some circuits, for example, companies have a
proactive responsibility to inform the marketplace when events evolve
in such a way as to render misleading some prior statement upon
which the market is still relying. In re Time Warner Inc. Securities Litiga-
tion is a good example, where the Second Circuit found that Time
Warner might have violated Rule lOb-5 by not issuing a press release
after it became clear that its prior strategy of seeking financial part-
ners would have to be abandoned in favor of a dilutive stock offer-
217ing. Courts have not done a good job of explaining the scienter re-
quirement here: Must there be some conscious awareness, or some
realization, that continued silence is (or in terms of recklessness, may
be) misleading?218 Or is that a legal question of duty, for which igno-
rance is no excuse-in which case scienter is largely meaningless? As-
suming the former, one can readily see how difficult it will be for
management to come to a conscious awareness of the need to ac-
knowledge the change, given management's commitment to the prior
course of action and its natural optimism that success may still be just
around the comer. The risk of hindsight bias here is also extremely
high, creating another reason for those who worry about the spillover
costs of regulation to doubt that a broad duty to update (or at least
219heavy civil liability for breach) is really a sensible legal doctrine.
reconceptualize the focus of securities-law disclosure away from investment-related
information generally (which is naturally susceptible to bias) in favor of a system that
simply tries to force disclosure of matters relating to managerial competence and in-
tegrity. See Paul G. Mahoney, Mandatory Disclosure as a Solution to Agency Problems, 62 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1047, 1090-93 (1995) (discussing the efficiency gains of agency informa-
tion).
217 9 F.3d 259, 267-68 (2d Cir. 1993); see also Greenfield v. Heublein, Inc., 742 F.2d
751, 758-60 (3d Cir. 1984) (recognizing the theory, but holding that no duty to correct
existed because defendant was never under a duty to disclose its first statement). The
duty exists when management has made a specific forward-looking statement that is
still "alive" in the marketplace at the time the new information appears. See Ross v.
A.H. Robins Co., 465 F. Supp. 904, 908 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) ("It is now clear that there is a
duty to correct or revise a prior statement... so long as the prior statement[] remains
,alive.'"), rev'd on othergrounds, 697 F.2d 545 (2d Cir. 1979); COX ET AL., supra note 11,
at 713-14 (discussing duty to update).
218 On this topic, but without clear resolution, see State Teachers Retirement Board v.
Fluor Corp., 654 F.2d 843, 850-51 (2d Cir. 1981) (holding that the defendant had no
obligation to disclose contract and that the defendant did not act recklessly or with
fraudulent intent by failing to disclose).
219 Not all courts have been impressed with the doctrine. See Stransky v. Cummins
Engine Co., 51 F.3d 1329, 1332 (7th Cir. 1995) (rejecting the doctrine); Backman v.
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IV. BEYOND CORPORATE DISCLOSURE: OTHER SOCIAL HARMS
From the foregoing prediction that a corporation's disclosure to
investors may sometimes be distorted, not in bad faith, but rather be-
cause cognitive forces and information-flow problems lead to a
skewed perception of reality by senior officials, we can extend the
same story to other sorts of social harms with little difficulty. At the
risk of some repetition, the following account is a generic story of
"wrongdoing" that is more a failure of rationality than an example of
venality. My aim here is simply to suggest that this genre of organiza-
tion theory has the potential to inform a broad range of issues in civil
and criminal law, where the anthropomorphic conception of the firm
still weighs heavily as well.20
Responding to strong internal and external pressures both to
grow and to increase profitability, most management groups search
continually for new technologies to exploit, such as a new product
line or new mechanisms for producing current ones more efficiently.
An auto manufacturer, for example, might determine that it is
worthwhile to introduce a highly inexpensive automobile to play in
the market for young or low-income purchasers (such as the Pinto,221
manufactured by Ford in the 1970s). Alternatively, a textile manufac-
turer might purchase more efficient, high-speed looms to respond
more effectively to foreign competition.w Predictably, some of those
judgments will turn out to be socially harmful-for example, a deci-
Polaroid Corp., 910 F.2d 10, 16-18 (1st Cir. 1990) (en banc) (refusing to apply the doc-
trine to the facts of the case and raising questions about its viability). Indeed, the Sec-
ond Circuit itself recognized that the duty must be limited lest it interfere with legiti-
mate corporate confidentiality needs. See San Leandro Emergency Med. Group Profit
Sharing Plan v. Philip Morris Cos., 75 F.3d 801, 809-10 (2d Cir. 1996) ("We are con-
cerned about interpreting the securities laws to force companies to give their competi-
tors advance notice of sensitive pricing information.").
= A recent symposium in the Southern California Law Review was devoted to organ-
izational-tort liability, with special attention to issues of vicarious liability. See Corporate
Tort Law Symposium, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 1679 (1996). The "anthropomorphic" claim is
made in Steven P. Croley, Vicarious Liability in Tort: On the Sources and Limits of Employee
Reasonableness, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 1705 (1996). On criminal law, see sources cited supra
note 4, summarizing various uses of organization theory. See also Barry D. Baysinger,
Organization Theory and the Criminal Liability of Organizations, 71 B.U. L. REV. 341, 361-63
(1991) (evaluating the United States Sentencing Commission's guidelines for organ-
izational crimes from the perspective of organization theory). See generally Symposium,
A National Conference on Sentencing of the Corporation, 71 B.U. L. REV. 189 (1991).
2 The Pinto case, of course, is well studied as a matter both of law and business
ethics. See, e.g., Gioia, supra note 118, at 380-81 (discussing Ford's introduction of the
Pinto in record time to compete with foreign corporations).
= This example comes fromJACKALL, supra note 69, at 101-05.
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sion to lower the safety level of a car to passengers and other motor-
ists, or increasing the noise level of looms, causing gradual hearing
loss to workers. The normal, culturally conditioned response is to say
that these corporations have chosen profits over social responsibility
deliberately. Yet, in many cases, the ultimate costs (monetary and
reputational) after being caught and penalized exceed the gains that
reasonably could have been predicted at the time.2
Sometimes firms do simply discover some patentable new product
or technology and enter the development and marketing stage com-
pletely confident of success. But this rarely occurs. Most strategic
steps are taken in an atmosphere of extremely high ambiguity, espe-
cially in the early stages. A new product or manufacturing process is
an interesting possibility, but answers to questions of successful manu-
facture, time frame, cost, market impact, and risk are all highly uncer-
tain. The high-level executive decision to move ahead with such a
project is a political act, for it will place resources and opportunities
in the hands of some managers rather than others. The political bat-
fling for resources requires careful impression management (most ef-
fective, as we have seen, if the proponents believe their own self-
serving representations).2 4 Here, natural optimism, coupled with
impression-management demands, leads to presentations to top offi-
cials that put aside risks (which are highly indeterminate anyway at
this early stage) and overstate the project's potential. M The senior
executives faced with the resource-allocation decision probably rec-
ognize the likely bias, and other managers competing for the same
resources will try to pick at the idea's soft spots. "Go ahead" decisions
are not easy to elicit. Even so, most senior executives also recognize
that decisions must be made, even in the face of high ambiguity.
That fact alone is not dispositive, of course. There can be rational choices for
social harm, for instance, if either the risk of detection or amount of penalty is subop-
timal. See generally GEORGE EADES & PETER REUTER, DESIGNING SAFER PRODUCTS 52-72
(1983) (discussing some of the decisionmaking behind the manufacture of dangerous
materials from a more rationalist, but still critical, perspective); Wendy E. Wagner,
Choosing Ignorance in the Manufacture of Toxic Products, 82 CORNELL L. REv. 773, 810-27
(1997) (arguing that the current system of liability encourages manufacturers to make
socially nonoptimal decisions concerning product-safety research).
224 See supra notes 148-55 and accompanying text.
m For a case study on this problem, see Andrew D. Brown, Politics, Symbolic Action
and Myth Making in Pursuit of Legitimacy, 15 ORG. STUD. 861 (1994). See also Andrew H.
Van de Ven & Douglas Polley, Learning While Innovating, 3 ORG. SCI. 92, 106-07 (1992)
(discussing the potential for interference with learning caused by these representa-
tions).
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Their social role prizes decisiveness and action, and they recognize
that waiting for ambiguity to be resolved before committing to any
significant course of action invites organizational paralysis. For these
reasons, choices are made, typically with a commitment to monitor
the chosen project in its early stages so that it can be abandoned at
relatively low cost should difficulties or risks surface.
Once the project begins, those closest to the situation (the win-
ners) have ample motivation to believe in its efficacy-their natural
optimism has now been rewarded by positive feedback from the top.
They are committed to a positive schema, and they recognize the po-
litical reality that the project can still be killed, so they wish to manage
the flow of information to prevent this from happening.27 An envi-
ronment is thus created that leads those with immediate access to in-
formation to sense, without full awareness necessarily, that risk-
related information will provoke stress and potential loss. Common
defense mechanisms are employed. After all, it is still early in the
project, so that any risks that surface at a conscious level remain
speculative and temporally remote, and thus are still susceptible to
rationalization. It becomes easy to explain them away and preserve
the aura of optimism. As a result, either the risks are not reported at
all, or they are communicated upward in a way that dulls them. Even
if there should be some conscious shading of the truth in reports to
superiors, it is probably not in bad faith, given the winners' optimistic
schema. Omission of certain information can be readily justified as a
means of avoiding disclosure that superiors might take out of context,
overreact to, or otherwise misunderstand. Higher-ups are then un-
likely to sense serious cause for concern.
To the extent that there is significant diffusion of responsibility
for surveying incoming information for danger signs, the ability to de-
flect signs of risk increases. Diffusion increases the ambiguity associ-
ated with one's own stock of data, and the act of raising a red flag
22 See NILS BRUNSSON, THE IRRATIONAL ORGANIZATION 21-28 (1985) (noting that
the role of a decisionmaker is to motivate the organization to action and that uncer-
tainty can lead to bewilderment and confusion); ROBERT G. LORD & KARENJ. MAHER,
LEADERSHIP AND INFORMATIONAL PROCESSES 66 (1991) (noting that one corporate
leader's "personality, being much more conservative, indecisive, and aloof, did not fit
well with expectations for typical leaders" (citation omitted)).
This portion of the story borrows from Darley's account, see Darley, supra note
160, at 21-22, 28-36, of corporate misbehavior, especially his recounting, from a social-
psychological perspective, of B.F. Goodrich's production of faulty brake assemblies for
military aircraft, based on Kermit Vandivier, Why Should My Conscience Bother Me, in
CORPORATE VIOLENCE 145 (Stuart L. Hills ed., 1987).
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threatens the newly established (and probably quite strong) group
cohesion. If the private information is ambiguous and no one else
acts troubled, the pressure is strong to dismiss the information.
Now let us assume that more significant, and less ambiguous,
danger signs gradually appear to those with the most direct access to
the information. Here, of course, the biases are likely to shift even
more from the cognitive to the motivated. Postdecisional commit-
ment becomes stronger: The winners are not only emotionally, but
also economically, invested in the project, the unwinding of which is
likely to have very troublesome career implications for those who find
themselves in this particular probationary crucible. They may well be
in something of a personal "last period." Their psychological resis-
tance hardens, and the temptation to distort disconfirming informa-
tion increases-still, however, not necessarily in bad faith (though, at
this point, some background awareness of trouble may surface). The
competition between conscience and motivated rationalization con-
tinues until the information becomes so clear-cut that its implications
are unavoidable. Once again, to the extent that access to information
is highly diffused, that may take quite some time. Presumably there
comes a time, however, at which an awareness of the project's risks or
dangers crystallizes. At that point, an active cover-up might begin,
though at the same time the once-thought-to-be winners may well also
start believing in a self-serving fashion that sufficient disclosure of the
risks was made such that responsibility for continuing the project rests
more with those higher up than with them. The important point, of
course, is that the final awareness of the risk or harm occurs some-
what after the point in time at which, both practically and legally, the
responsible actors are likely to be held accountable. This is the opti-
mism-commitment whipsaw effect. 2s As one of the more polite say-
ings goes, the managers find themselves "knee-deep in the big
muddy."22
As to supervisory executives a step or two removed from the proj-
ect itself, their ability to monitor is compromised by two basic factors.
The first is the likely distortion of information. Even if some senior
W' See David C. Wilson et al., Hon Organizations Can Overbalance: Decision Overreach
as a ReasonforFailur4 39 AM. BEHAV. SC. 995, 1005-06 (1996) (discussing the problem
of overfamiliarity as contributing to overreach).
2D Barry M. Staw et al., Knee-Deep in the Big Muddy: A Study of Escalating Commitment
to a Chosen Course of Action, 16 ORG. BEHAv. & HUM. PERFORMANCE 27 (1976) (quoting
the title); see id. at 28-30 (discussing investors' tendency to commit additional re-
sources to a poor investment in order to justify the initial investment).
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managers have private suspicions about the possibility of bias from be-
low, there are often no alternative sources of data in order to test for
it. As Chris Argyris argues, many corporate cultures discourage open
expressions of doubt and skepticism, which skew the information
flow.23 0 The second is the increasing commitment of the superior
who approved the project as the investment in the project increases.
Nearly all firms do have accountability or internal-control systems
designed to prevent information distortion of a gross sort. Account-
ing-control systems are well-suited to monitor the use and disposition
of corporate assets, but on a basis that emphasizes current and his-
toric reporting, not future trends. Information relating to product
and technology risks shows up only very late in budgetary or financial
controls. There may be other compliance functions as well, but these
all tend to lack direct access to information about subjective matters
such as product development and engineering defects. What infor-
mation senior managers do see is likely to be fairly ambiguous, and
their own biases (cognitive conservatism if nothing else) can readily
lead to their ignoring some kinds of risks. Dennis Gioia's study of the
failure of Ford's recall departments to become aware of the Pinto's
danger to consumers in light of its heavy workload (such that limited
time and attention could be given to any particular matter), and the
ease with which initial crash information could be explained away in
terms that suggested minimal, containable danger, provides a good
example of the limits of external monitoring.23'
Now that we have a plausible account that can fit many sorts of
"corporate misconduct" cases, from the manufacture of defective
products to the disposal of toxic waste to the adoption of manufactur-
ing processes that threaten worker health or safety-all potential torts
or crimes-we might ask of what significance it all is. Because both
tort and criminal law pursue so many competing objectives, I could
232not hope to offer a single answer. The attribution of blame is a so-
2o See supra note 78.
2" See Gioia, supra note 118, at 386-88. Of course, companies could build more
intrusive and effective monitoring systems, but these are likely to be very expensive
and imperfect, threatening to overall corporate morale (and hence efficiency), and
subject to manipulation in any event. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
232 There are obvious questions about whether it is "unreasonable" to ignore risks
because of very natural and commonplace psychological and social mechanisms.
Cognitive limitations have become increasingly interesting to torts scholars, in terms
of both victim and wrongdoer behavior. See, e.g., Howard A. Latin, Problem-Solving Be-
havior and Theories of Tort Liability, 73 CAL. L. REV. 677, 745 (1985) (arguing that tort
liability and compensation systems should be keyed to the attention parties give to
[Vol. 146: 101
ORGANIZED ILLUSIONS
cial act for which blameworthiness must sometimes be manufactured
to maintain the illusion of a controllable world, especially when there
are identifiable victims.2
s
But some observations may be useful, if not dispositive. For in-
stance, from an economic standpoint, we see from the above how dif-
ficult it might be for companies to price rationally to cover the risk of
future harms from new products. In terms of deterrence, to say that
organizations have natural biases hardly argues by itself for a shift
from vicarious to individual actor-based liability; individuals are bi-
ased as well, maybe more so.3 While groups sometimes exacerbate
biases, that is not always the case, and there is always the potential to
build into the corporate system checks and balances that reduce the
likelihood that one or a small number of biased managers will cause
significant social harm.
What does seem likely is that highly indeterminate legal stan-
dards-such as those based on "reasonableness" or "good faith"--will
have a less direct impact on firm behavior than we would like to
think.235 The managerial bias is to perceive the firm's actions as both
.reasonable and in good faith. In this light, a legal rule mandating
that a company face a penalty if it acts unreasonably will not be all
that potent in affecting day-to-day activity. A rule mandating "reason-
ableness" or "good faith" ignores the many reasons that managers,
and thus organizations, resist becoming aware of either unreason-
ableness or bad faith. Because managers fail to perceive unreason-
ableness and bad faith, they cannot modify their conduct in response
to the legal rule. s
risk); W. Kip Viscusi, Individual Rationality, Hazard Warnings and the Foundations of Tort
Law, 48 RUTGERS L. REv. 625, 628 (1996) (assessing the degree to which people can
process hazard warnings and how cognitive limitations affect the criteria for hazard-
warning policy). For comparable implications for tax law at the individual level, see
Jeff T. Casey & John T. Scholz, Beyond Deterrence: Behavioral Decision Theory and Tax
Compliance; 25 L. & SOC'YREv. 821 (1991).
2' See, e.g., MARY DOUGLAS, RISK AND BLAME 6 (1992) (suggesting that blame co-
erces standardized behavior within a community).
25 See Croley, supra note 220, at 1719-25 (discussing biases of the individual).
On the relationship between legal ambiguity and organizational response, see
Suchman & Edelman, supra note 6, at 932-33.
While insensitivity is the problem on which we are focusing, sensitivity may also
become an issue. Scholars are increasingly willing to recognize "overlegalized" organ-
izational responses. These are most likely to occur either when the legal dictate is
highly salient and unambiguous, or when peer organizations have responded visibly so
that a claim to legitimacy is at stake. See Donna M. Randall & Douglas D. Baker, The
Threat of Legal Liability and Managerial Decision Making Regulation of Reproductive Health
in the Workplace, in THE LEGAISTIC ORGANIZATION, supra note 75, at 169, 181
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There are thus grounds to fear organizational insensitivity to cer-
tain kinds of legal dictates. 7 The natural response for the law would
be to increase the sanctions, hoping to make the law salient enough
to break through the organization's thick cognitive defenses.2 s As
(discussing a large mining firm which adopted extensive fetal-protection policies as a
result of "vivid cues of legal liability"). Additionally, when there are competing claims
within the organization about the proper course of action, legal dictates (both to avoid
the threat of liability and to gain external legitimacy) can be used to break the logjam.
See Martha S. Feldman & Alan J. Levy, Effects of Legal Context on Decisionmaking Under
Ambiguity, in THE LEGALISTIC ORGANIZATION, supra note 75, at 109, 127-28 ("[T]he law
narrows the frame of reference and limits what is relevant to decision making in at
least three specific ways. It limits the issues that are under consideration. It specifies
procedures for introducing information as relevant to an issue. It establishes defini-
tions that constrain all claimants."). It is entirely possible that legal actors within or-
ganizations may overstate the law's dictates (or overstate its ambiguity) to give them-
selves a greater claim to organizational resources. See Lauren B. Edelman et al.,
Professional Construction of Law: The Inflated Threat of Wrongful Discharge, 26 L. & SOC'Y
REV. 47, 80 (1992) (discussing overstatement of wrongful-discharge law by the legal
and personnel professions); Donald C. Langevoort & Robert K. Rasmussen, Skewing the
Results: The Role of Lawyers in Transmitting Legal Rules, 5S. CAL. INTERDisC. L.J. 375, 434
(1997) ("[L]awyers whose writing or speaking deals with the management of risk are
motivated to inflate the seriousness of those risks in order to justify the claim that sub-
stantial skill and expertise is required to deflect them.").
27 For an exploration of sensitivity to legal dictates generally in tort law, see Gary
T. Schwartz, Reality in the Economic Analysis of Tort Law: Does Tort Law Really Deter, 42
UCLA L. REV. 377 (1994). See also Wagner, supra note 223, at 810-22 (arguing that cur-
rent tort law discourages safety research). To be sure, as noted above, high sanctions
can prompt certain kinds of ex ante structural responses to minimize the likelihood of
unlawful behavior. But we also have seen that monitoring and detection systems work
better for some kinds of harms than others. A strong threat of liability for hazardous-
waste discharge, for instance, can prompt firms to establish environmental audit and
testing offices outside of the normal lines of operational authority to avoid the prob-
lem caused by biased perception and reporting of environmental compliance by plant
managers. See Max H. Bazerman et al., Environmental Degradation: Exploring the Rift Be-
tween Environmentally Benign Attitudes and Environmentally Destructive Behaviors, in CODES
OF CONDUCT, supra note 149, at 256, 261-66 (discussing self-serving biases that impede
people's ability to address environmental problems). In fact, there is no phase of a
corporation's business that could not be double-checked by some independent
authority from within or outside the firm that is specifically charged with establishing
legal compliance. Independent monitors would lack the kinds of biases borne of
commitment and conflict of interest that plague the primary line managers. Yet we
rarely observe such intrusive compliance mechanisms. The reason, probably, is that
the risk of serious defective products or harmful manufacturing processes is low any-
way, so that highly expensive monitoring and testing systems are hard tojustify. Their
indirect costs, as we noted earlier, are also considerable, since overprecaution puts the
firm at a severe competitive disadvantage. See supra notes 208-10 and accompanying
text. Furthermore, senior managers are likely to underestimate the possibility of the
harm occurring in the first place, and may well overestimate their ability to detect and
control it on a day-to-day basis through more normal oversight of their line managers.
Obviously, this is not the only strategy. Government monitoring or required
third-party intervention could also address the problem, but again, at considerable
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sanctions grow more draconian, however, we encounter the familiar
problem of overprecaution.23' Firms will add layers of legal audit,
product testing, and other compliance units, which impose a burden
on productivity, slowing down research and development timetables,
and making it more likely that the company will forgo attractive com-
petitive opportunities. The risks associated with the overlegalized
corporation are well noted in the literature, and without a more so-
phisticated empirical understanding of organizational behavior, it is
hard to predict whether any given high sanction will tend to overde-
ter rather than strike the right balance.
CONCLUSION
Because organizations are so pervasive in society, theories of or-
ganizational behavior are rarely far from the surface in legal dis-
course. When tort law asks about deterring the manufacture of dan-
gerous products, or securities law about the desire to compel truthful
disclosure to investors, the problem is posed clearly: Whatever rule or
policy the law favors will have to affect the behavior of a disparate but
interrelated group of human actors, notjust a single individual, if it is
to be effective. Addressing this intelligently demands that we know
something about how behavior changes and outcomes occur in set-
tings of diffused, but connected, power and responsibility.
Precisely because so many important normative matters in law
depend on implicit (often naive) theories of organizational behavior,
building a more robust account of such behavior is intellectually valu-
able. In practical terms, moreover, there is virtue in drawing norma-
tive conclusions from accounts that conform better to the often jaun-
diced intuitions and experience of judges, administrators, and other
cost. Although it is beyond the scope of this Article, there is ample reason to believe
that government agents bring their own biases to bear on regulatory problems, creat-
ing different-but still costly-distortions. See, e.g., Clayton P. Gillette & James E.
Krier, Risk, Courts, and Agencies, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 1027, 1090-99 (1990) (discussing
decisionmaking biases of agencies).
"9 See Bruce Chapman, Corporate Tort Liability and the Problem of Overcompliance 69 S.
CAL L. REV. 1679, 1687-94 (1996) (discussing the problem of excessive levels of cor-
porate care). Chapman's fear that corporate overcompliance may be more of a prob-
lem than undercompliance may be correct for any number of reasons outside the
scope of this Article. My point is simply that tort law should take into account the po-
tential for cognitive resistance in assessing its general strategy.
214 See, e.g.,Jeffrey Pfeffer, The Costs of Legalization: The Hidden Dangers of Increasingly
Formalized Control, in THE LEGALIsTIc ORGANIZATION, supra note 75, at 329 (discussing
the costs of the "legalistic mentality" in American corporations).
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policymakers on the subject of organizational rationality. While I
hope to have generated a handful of usable practical insights for the
formulation of securities-law policy, this Article is also meant to be an
early step toward the development of a usable general theory on how
organizations respond to legal dictates. Assuming that these insights
survive criticism and testing, the kinds of hypotheses drawn here re-
garding organizational cognition and rationality could eventually
help both scholars and policymakers assess with far greater realism
and sensitivity the costs and benefits of alternative legal strategies in
those settings in which organizations are dominant economic actors.
For either securities law or the law generally, that would be no small
contribution.
